Conventionalism as the Component of Meaning: Examination of Davidson's View

Document Type : Original Research

Authors
Hooman Mohammad Ghorbanian 1
Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati 2
Lotfollah Nabavi 3
Arsalan Golfam 4
1 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Isfahan , Isfahan ,Iran.
2 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
3 Professor of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
4 Associate Professor of Linguistics, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Davison has two famous articles against conventionalism. The core of his argument is to scrutinize erroneous but successful conversations which happen in language occasionally and conventional meaning cannot explain how the speaker and the listener understand each other in these cases. However, his premises are not clear and it makes it difficult to study and criticize his main point. We believe there are at least five premises such as: 1) The listener comprehends the words the speaker has said in their conventional meaning; 2) If the conversation is successful then the listener has understood the words and sentences in their general first meaning; 3) Sometimes the conversation is successful although there are some misuse of words; 4) In these cases the conventional meaning is not the same as general first meaning; 5) If the listener comprehends the words in their general first meaning, then he has not in his mind their conventional meaning; so (Conclusion) conventionalism is not acceptable. We claim that we can save the conventionalism by analyzing these premises and pointing out that users of a language can have several meanings of a word in their mind and choose between them according to hints and backgrounds. Besides, conventional theory of meaning can accept new and different uses of words that have already been used in some old fashion ways, and in addition, special cases occur rarely in everyday use of linguistic expressions. So, opposing Davidson, we have sound grounds to keep conventionalism.

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The International Journal of Humanities
Volume 28, Issue 1
Winter 2021
Pages 12-24