Showing 4 results for Warrant
Volume 5, Issue 1 (1-2025)
Abstract
Atheists often believe that modern science supports their viewpoint. Some claim that the metaphysical basis of contemporary science leaves no room for religious beliefs, asserting that there is a fundamental incompatibility between science and theism. However, a couple of philosophers argue that this claim is misguided and that there are actually compelling reasons to see a profound compatibility between theism and science. In this paper, we will demonstrate, based on Alvin Plantinga's epistemology on one hand and Al-Ghazali's hermeneutic theory on the other, that not only is there no serious conflict between science and theistic beliefs, but we can also view them as interdependent.
Volume 15, Issue 3 (12-2011)
Abstract
Transferor’s duty to make the receiver capable of using subject matter of the contract (i.e., technology) is an essential element of the purpose of the contract. For this reason, the duty to transfer shall be treated as an essential contractual duty of the transferor. With due consideration of the general principles of contract law, usage employed in the market of technology transaction and relevant laws of certain countries actively engaged in this market, a number of significant results come into view. First, this obligation constitutes the core of the transferor’s contractual obligations. Second, this duty shall be regarded as an implied term, which does not need to be agreed in express. Third, to perform this undertaking, the transferor shall also be impliedly obliged to warrant the sufficiency and adequacy of the technology. Analysing the warranty obligation shows that only some parts of this duty shall be treated as implied term, and the others need to be agreed by the parties in express. Furthermore, the present study shows that the receiver’s main concurrent obligation is to pay money in exchange for the duty to transfer. This obligation can be performed in three methods: lump sump payment, running royalty payment, and a combination these two. When the second method is used, it will serve the receiver because it will correlate the transferor’s interests into efficient performance of the technology. In addition, duty of confidentiality, territorial restriction, defence of the aggrieved party against any party’s rights and claims are further obligations imposed on the parties under this contract, though it would be difficult to treat them as the main contractual obligations.
* Corresponding Author’s E-mail: sadegh_m@modares.ac.ir
Volume 20, Issue 1 (3-2016)
Abstract
Currently, a large number of products are being sold with warranty policies and product warranty has started playing an important role in today’s fiercely competitive products market. In this study, a model for determining the optimal price of PRW with fixed period presented. In designing this model, the rate of rectification costs in the product warranty period is affected by inflation rate, and customers are risk averse for future repair costs. The cost of failure is considered as a random variable and the failure rate of products as a function of time. Using the Exponential utility function, a model for determining the optimal warranty cost, based on risk averse buyers point of view, was developed. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the optimal warranty price is analyzed with a numerical example with respect to such factors as (1) the customers' risk preferences, (2) their perceptions about the product failure rate, and (3) the customers' repair price.
Rasoul Rasoulipour,
Volume 28, Issue 1 (1-2021)
Abstract
The main argument of the book Warranted Christian Belief by Plantinga is a distinction between de facto and de jure objections to Christian belief. De facto objections, according to him, are those about the truth of Christian belief, where the claim is relatively straightforward that rge belief is false. However, Plantinga is primarily concerned with de jure objections, which are arguments or claims that Christian belief, whether or not true, is at any rate unjustifiable, or irrational, or without sufficient evidence, or in some way not intellectually respectable. While the conclusion of such objections is that there is something wrong with Christian belief, Plantinga contends that the question is never explicitly formulated of what exactly is wrong; however, he finally locates a promising candidate for the de jure question in the complaints against theistic belief by Freud and Marx. Critics, according to Plantinga, cannot simply object to the rationality or justifiability of theistic belief without presupposing that theistic belief is false. However, I will, in this paper, argue that the epistemic objection to the rationality of theism need not presuppose the falsity of theism or Christian belief, and I will show that the most important charge against Plantinga’s defense – if theism is true, it is warranted – is that it proves too much.
