Showing 4 results for Skepticism
Volume 2, Issue 2 (11-2022)
Abstract
Putnam argues that accepting semantic externalism would require refuting the brains-in-a-vat skeptical hypothesis, and as a result, the skeptic will not succeed in proving her claim. Putnam's argument, however, is epistemically circular and inconclusive. The present article is devoted to evaluating Wright and Noonan's attempt to provide a plausible version of Putnam's argument. Based on the evaluation of these arguments, it was determined that (1) Wright and Noonan's arguments can at best only show that I am not a brain in a vat, but without the use of any auxiliary premises, they can not prove that we are not brains in a vat; (2) Contrary to Wright's claim, this premise of his argument that In BIVese, “brain-in-a-vat” does not refer to brains-in-a-vat, and its result, that is, that my language is not BIVese, lead his argument to be epistemically circular; and (3) Noonan's attempt to avoid epistemic circularity has not led to the desired result, and his argument, like Wright's, is epistemically circular.
Volume 3, Issue 3 (9-2023)
Abstract
Epistemic Skepticism is one of the most controversial issues in epistemology. To block it, some find the failure of closure helpful. Dretske puts forward a recursive analysis of Knowledge. In his view, the analysis makes the closure principle fail which in turn helps to undermine the paradigmatic arguments for epistemic Skepticism. However, some including contextualists, dogmatists, or neo-mooreans, on the other hand, maintain the closure and yet undermine skepticism. In the present paper, I am not going to explore various approaches to preserving closure, criticize Dretske’s analysis as a knowledge nor will I study the setbacks of closure failure. I intend to show that, contrary to the current understanding of Dretske’s analysis, the mentioned analysis does not necessarily lead up to closure failure: There is a specific reading of the recursive base such that not only does it preserve the closure principle but also it offers a way to defeat the classic arguments for Skepticism. To better examine my suggestion compared to Dreske’s and see their exact differences, I will first study Dretske’s analysis of knowledge. Then, I will show that my suggestion respects the closure principle yet undermines skepticism.
Volume 5, Issue 3 (12-2015)
Abstract
The main purpose of this research is to develope a model for identification of organizational skepticism and its concepts. Grounded theory method applied for this research. Available non probable sampling method has been used and structural interviews have been performed with employees of private companies. Sampling continued until saturation point in answers has been reached (24 interviews). After using this method, including open and axial and selecting coding, causes and consequences of organizational skepticism have been identified. causes have been investigated in two fields. First, organizational management (management style and personal characteristics of manager and human resource management process and activities and Performance evaluation system) and Second, Organization related fields (organizational cynicism, organizational justice and organizational climate). Consequences of organizational skepticism also have been investigated in two fields of individual and organizational. Short-term effects of individual variables such as organizational indifference, motivational, lack of willingness to participate, job stress and burnout and long-term effects of individual variables such as low productivity of individual, corporate sabotage, poor quality of external engagement, life satisfaction and organizational frustration were classified. These consequences have also led to a long-term impact on organizational outcomes such as low productivity of the organization.
Hamidreza Mahboobi Arani,
Volume 28, Issue 1 (1-2021)
Abstract
In the preface to his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant characterizes his own critical metaphysics as the main opponent of dogmatism, which inevitably results in the assertion of conflicting dogmas especially about the existence of God, the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul. Simultaneously, Kant subtly distinguishes his critical philosophy from three other stances opposing dogmatism: the skepticism of Descartes and Hume, the empiricism of John Lock, and the indifferentism of thinkers who, without rejecting metaphysical assertions, refute any attempt to argue for them systematically and rigorously. Refusing indifferentism, Kant somehow admits a commonsensical view similar to that of indifferentism regarding principal issues of metaphysics. Touching very briefly on Kant’s view, the paper examines Nietzsche's take on especially the issue of the existence of the Christian God. Defending a kind of stance similar to skepticism or even, in some aspects, to indifferentism, Nietzsche’s chief endeavor is to look at the issue from the different perspectives of genealogical and axiological critiques in order to pave the way for an entire overlooking the issue. In this respect, such an endeavor results in a stance contrary to Kant’s commonsensical position, ending up in Nietzsche’s talk of the Death of God and the Death of the True World.
