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Criticizing the history of philosophy and epistemology definitely requires great courage, because the effects and consequences of this can lead to dangerous results. When we ignore any metaphysical and superhuman beings and generally explain any epistemological issues in the explanation of our knowledge strategy, then the result can lead to nihilism, absurdism, disorder and anarchism. It can be dangerous and toxic both for the individual and for the society. While we expect to encounter such nihilistic thought in Rorty's thought, on the contrary, the philosopher in question claims that his thought will not be led to what was mentioned. Rather, it seeks pleasure, happiness and happiness for humans, because although there is no longer talk of truth and goodness, but by expanding the solidarity between human "us" as much as possible, it seeks to change this road and move towards a human utopia. Our purpose of writing this article is to investigate and analyze the position of the epistemological foundations of ethics in Rorty's thought.

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In our times, the relationship between philosophy and literary theory has been addressed in a variety of different ways. This paper aims to demonstrate in an a posteriori manner how philosophy contributes to literary theory. In doing so, it stands in direct opposition to Rorty’s pragmatic conception of the relationship between these two fields of human knowledge. Philosophy, it is argued, can make at least four contributions to literary theory and the paper is accordingly divided into four parts: (1) it clarifies the ontological status of the literary work; (2) it helps us see the problem of discovering the author’s intention in a new light by questioning our Cartesian presuppositions concerning the relationship between mind and body, (3) it clarifies the philosophical roots of modern literary theory by putting these theories in their proper philosophical context; and finally (4) it paves the way for a critique of the modern relativism and constructivism inherent in modern literary theory. The paper thus ends by showing that if one accepts the possible ways in which philosophy contributes to literary theory and especially finds the critique launched against constructivism in part four plausible, then one has every reason to remain doubtful about Rorty’s view of the subject.

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Asking about the place of religion in a democratic society refers straightforwardly to the kind of pluralism we adopt. Given that intra-societal tensions mark out a democratic pluralistic society, then it seems that there is no doubt that there should be a place for religion and religious people in it. What is crucial for a democratic society is taking a suitable view on pluralism. There could be, at least, two versions of pluralism: Incommensurable or radical and commensurable or moderate. It is argued that the incommensurable account of pluralism confronts with serious problems both theoretically (like the impossibility of outer critique) and practically (like replacing persuasion with force). Rorty advocates a commensurable pluralism based on pragmatic conventions or “know-how” skills without any meta-narrative or translation manual among the doctrines of rival views. However, along with Davidson, it is stated that some kind of translation among the rival views is inevitable. In addition, it is argued that commensurable pluralism could not be limited to merely know-how skills and it needs some know-that insights. This view of pluralism not only opens the door of dialogue, but also provides a basis for removing superficial differences or conflicts between the rivals. Real differences, however, could remain and should be tolerated.