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Showing 2 results for Donald Davidson
Volume 0, Issue 0 (2-2024)
Abstract
Explaining the nature of metaphor and its role in language has always been a controversial topic in the fields of linguistics, philosophy of language, rhetoric, and so forth. In metaphor analysis, these fields often converge in an inseparable manner. Donald Davidson, a 20th-century philosopher, is one of the influential theorists in the Philosophy of Language and the Theory of Meaning. His views on the essence and role of metaphor in language bear significant similarities to the ideas of al-Jurjani, a prominent 5th-century Hijri literary scholar. This research aims, through a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, to examine the intersection points of Davidson’s and al-Jurjani’s theories, with one addressing metaphor from a philosophical and linguistic perspective and the other from a rhetorical standpoint. For this purpose, Davidson’s essay "What Metaphors Mean?" is used as the basis for reviewing his theories on metaphor. Al-Jurjani’s views are analyzed with a focus on "Dala'il al-I'jaz." This study yields results in three areas. The first, identifies similar aspects in the two theories, indicating that both theorists reject the idea of metaphor being merely a shortened simile. They also critique the notion of "metaphorical meaning," emphasizing that the meaning of a metaphor cannot be reproduced in any form other than the metaphorical one itself. The second area involves finding complementary aspects in the two theories, considering Davidson's philosophical stance and al-Jurjani's rhetorical position. The third area elaborates on the connection between al-Jurjani's direct views on metaphor and the ideas indirectly inferred from theory of Construction.
Hooman Mohammad Ghorbanian, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati, Lotfollah Nabavi, Arsalan Golfam,
Volume 28, Issue 1 (1-2021)
Abstract
Davison has two famous articles against conventionalism. The core of his argument is to scrutinize erroneous but successful conversations which happen in language occasionally and conventional meaning cannot explain how the speaker and the listener understand each other in these cases. However, his premises are not clear and it makes it difficult to study and criticize his main point. We believe there are at least five premises such as: 1) The listener comprehends the words the speaker has said in their conventional meaning; 2) If the conversation is successful then the listener has understood the words and sentences in their general first meaning; 3) Sometimes the conversation is successful although there are some misuse of words; 4) In these cases the conventional meaning is not the same as general first meaning; 5) If the listener comprehends the words in their general first meaning, then he has not in his mind their conventional meaning; so (Conclusion) conventionalism is not acceptable. We claim that we can save the conventionalism by analyzing these premises and pointing out that users of a language can have several meanings of a word in their mind and choose between them according to hints and backgrounds. Besides, conventional theory of meaning can accept new and different uses of words that have already been used in some old fashion ways, and in addition, special cases occur rarely in everyday use of linguistic expressions. So, opposing Davidson, we have sound grounds to keep conventionalism.
