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Showing 4 results for saeedimehr
Mohammad saeedimehr,
Volume 17, Issue 1 (3-2010)
Abstract
During the last centuries, great religious traditions as well as prominent philosophical and theological schools have been facing the so-called "problem of evil" and trying to solve it in a reasonable and convincing way. This paper seeks to explore Muslim philosophers' approach to the problem and examine their proposed solutions for it. After the main versions of the problem in Islamic philosophy are briefly sketched, the author explains its view about the non-existential nature of evil. At this stage, he discusses the challenge of "apprehensional evil" and three reactions to it. Then he turns to three main solutions proposed by Muslim philosophers in order to meet three versions of the problem of evil, i.e., the problem of evils and God's decree, the problem of creation-dualism and the problem of evils and Divine wisdom.
Vahid Khademzadeh, Mohammad saeedimehr,
Volume 24, Issue 1 (1-2017)
Abstract
Unlike Aristotle, Lakoff considers metaphor as an integral part of the process of human thinking and believes that humans often automatically and unconsciously learn and use a wide range of conceptual metaphors. A large part of our scientific and philosophical literature is full of conceptual metaphors. According to Lakoff, like other abstract concepts, causation is made of a small literal part which is extended by various kinds of conceptual metaphors in several directions. The current paper shows that a large part of the metaphors introduced by Lakoff, has been used by Muslim philosophers to describe causation. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Mulla Sadra are two of the most significant Islamic philosophers. According to Ibn Sina, causation is based on ‘Causation is Transfer of Possessions’ metaphor. This metaphor depicts causation as a three-component relation in which the boundaries are very strong and sharp. According to Mulla Sadra, causation is based on ‘Causation is Motion out’ metaphor. This metaphor makes causation to have two components and decreases the strength of boundaries between the components of the relation.
Zahra Mahmudkelayeh, Reza Akbarian, Mohammad saeedimehr,
Volume 24, Issue 2 (5-2017)
Abstract
Providing an exact explication of rationality in a way that would lead to the explication of the scope of rational discourse is among the most fundamental problems of philosophers. In the current essay the author struggles to reach a comprehensive definition of rationality via an exact description and analysis of ideas of Mulla Sadra (1571-1641) as the most significant philosophical figure in the Islamic world according to which one can present all human achievements in the domain of knowledge and science as manifestations of this rationality. Rationality in Sadra’s intellectual system represents a comprehensive term with an analogically graded meaning that in different levels of certainty guarantees the validity of applied, theoretical and intuitive sciences. This comprehensive perspective of the domain of rational discourse can put an end to many disputes on the exact sense of rationality and in doing so, it can bring about a basis for more interaction and sympathy among scholars in various branches of science and open the path for deeper dialogue.
Mohammad saeedimehr,
Volume 28, Issue 1 (1-2021)
Abstract
Throughout the history of philosophy and theology, diverse versions of the problem of evil have raised different solutions in the form of different theodicies. In this paper, I first offer an exposition of one of these solutions developed by Shiite theologians. Since the core notion of this solution is “God’s compensation for the sufferings” I call it the “compensation theodicy.” Based on some theological principles such as rational goodness and badness and the principle of lutf (God’s grace), and some preliminary remarks about pain and its classifications, the compensation theodicy shows that since God is totally wise and just, He compensates for all undeserved (both human’s and animal’s) sufferings He is responsible for. Thus, the presence of undeserved suffering is not at odds with Divine justice. After explaining the relevant issue of God’s litigation (intisaf) and discussing some main aspects of compensation, I then make a brief comparison between the compensation theodicy and the so-called afterlife theodicy. I finally argue that the compensation theodicy is cable of providing good response to the challenge of the lack of moral justification.
