

Dialectic of War and World Order

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to apply Ibn-Khaldun's dialectic of Asabiyya to explain the nature of relationship between war and the world order in the modern era via 'macro-structural change'. It is argued here that these changes in the world order in the modern times have a dialectical relationship with war. Here, Ibn-Khaldun's approach to historical change is applied for the explication of this relationship. Ibn-Khaldun's well-known historiographic enterprise does provide us with an analytical framework of how wars have been interrelated with the distribution of power and change in that distribution. This paper attempts to show the historical significance of war for the formation and the disintegration of world order since the 16th century.

Keywords: War, World Order, Dialectic, Ibn-Khaldun.

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Introduction

In his article, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace", Robert Jervis argues that "[t]he motor of international politics has been war among the leading states". There, he points out that not only war strongly influences the boundaries and distribution of values among "leading states", but it deeply affects their internal arrangements and shapes the fates of smaller states. (Jervis 2002:11) These observations are further supported by the fact that, military victories, combined with consequent developments in international law and international organization, have always practically regulated the affairs of states (Barkawi, 2004: 162). Charles Tilly has also invited attention to the significant historical fact that "over the millennium as a whole, war has been the dominant activity of European states." (Jervis, 2002: 9)

It has also been indicated that widespread use of force has been fundamental to the European imperial expansion and the creation of modern international economy. Most often this took the form of Western military intervention in the non-European world, where genocides of aboriginals were a significant dimension. Repeated and sustained use of force has been necessary for "creating and maintaining a free trading world". As Drayton has argued, 'what we now call Europe, Africa, the Americas and Asia were constructed

together in the midst of a relationship, at once economic and cultural, military and political', (Barkawi, 2004:162) As Gilroy explains:

...the history of black slavery is not conceived as the property only of Afro - Caribbean, or African Americans or even of Africans alone; for this history, 'has a great bearing on ideas of what the West was and is today'. (Gilroy in Barkawi:162) The most explicit consequence of omnipresence of war and the colonial expansion in modern European history has been the formation of a new world order consisted of a "center" (Europe) and a "periphery" (Americas and Africa). As Frantz Fanon has pointed out, 'Europe is literally the creation of the Third World' (Fanon, 1967:81).

A Theoretical Approach to War

Notwithstanding the attention paid to war by International Theory, modern social theory has not been attentive to the issue of war. The study of war has mostly been didactic and normative, for, wars were studied to deduce either immutable principles or lines of development as guides to the efficient conduct of war in the future." (Howard, 1986: ix) Through the second half of the 20th century there was a sense of pessimism regarding the status of theories of war. However, after two decades, following serious theoretical debate and empirical testing, greater clarity was brought into this complex subject (Kohout, 2003:24). Yet, modern social

theory can be said to have failed “to grapple with the centrality of war for modernity”. Major theories such as those of Habermas, Luhmann or the poststructuralists, for example, “contain hardly any mention of war and peace” (Barkawi, 2004: 162). In short, contrary to the outstanding significance of war, modern social theory has failed to give a justified account of war in human history. This, however, is what Ibn Khaldun, the social theoretician of the eight century A.H (fifteenth century A.D), has done in *Al-Muqaddimah* (Prolegomenon), which has been identified as “the first proper social theory proper”. It is argued here that changes in the world order in modern times have taken place in a dialectical process. To prove this, Ibn-Khaldun’s dialectical approach to historical change has been used as the analytical framework of how wars have been interrelated with the change in the distribution of power in the world arena during the modern era. To do this, historical data has been invoked to show that Ibn Khaldun's theoretical enterprise of the *elm al umran* can explain the dialectical nature of the relationship between war and the world order.

In *Al-Muqaddimah*, Ibn-Khaldun has formulated an innovative theoretical formulation to explain historical change in Islamic-North African civilizational territory. *Al-Muqaddimah* has been identified by Christopher Loyd as the first known attempt in

writing ‘Structural History’. Loyd refers to Ibn Khaldun as a significant non-western historian. According to him, *Muqaddimah* is the first known attempt in writing on “Structural History”. Loyd, however, does not elaborate on this point any further and ignores Ibn Khaldun in his comprehensive scheme on theories of “Structural History” (Loyd, 1996: 11 – 65).

In “Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order”, Cox also employs Ibn- Khaldun’s ideas for reconsidering the conventional principles in the study of international relations. He has, identified Ibn-Khaldun’s *asabiyya* (collective concious) as a significant methodological tool for studying and understanding of change in the world arena (Cox, 1992:71). By the same token, the analytical framework of *Elm al Umran* can, therefore, be applied to the study of war in the modern European History.

Ibn Khaldun’s theoretical undertaking, which regards the political, social, and cultural aspects of a civilization as a totality in flux, explains the dynamic of social change as a multifaceted dialectic. *Elm-al Umran*, a discipline formatted by Ibn – Khaldun, has true precedence over the recently emerged field of Historical Sociology, a discipline which asks “questions about social structures or processes” which are understood to be situated in time and space. (Skocpol, 1987: 2) This field “looks for the mechanisms through which societies change

or reproduce themselves.” (Smith, 1991: 1)

According to Ibn Khaldun’s theoretical framework, the mechanism of historical change consists of two dialectical moments: the first is the loss of social cohesion, and the second is that of change from one social formation (*umran*) to another, a process mediated by war. Each *umran*, according to Ibn-Khaldun corresponds to a particular material life condition, namely *umran badavi* (nomadic life, periphery) and *umran hadhari* (settled life, center) (Ibn Khaldun, 1967: 91). The *badavi* formation pertains to a harsh life-environment, very simple economic structure, and strong social cohesion (*asabiyya*). *Asabiyya* has been translated variously as ‘the vitality of the state’ ‘the life of the people’, ‘*Lebenskraft*’, ‘public spirit’, “*esprit de corps*”, ‘social solidarity’, ‘group cohesion’ and ‘common will’ (Lacoste, 1984: 101). According to Ibn Khaldun, the *badavi* formation gradually expands itself through skirmishes with other *badavi* groups until a dominant formation is formed. Power and wealth concentrate in the dominant *umran*, the way of life changes into a settled life, namely a *hadhary* life formation. In modern terminology, the *badavi* life is formed in the condition of scarcity, whereas, the *hadhari* life is formed in the condition of abundance:

[W]hen a [nomad] tribe acquires victories due to the power of asabiyya, it obtains riches and lives in luxury and growth of livelihood.

Therefore, the habits of luxury and sinking deeply in the pursuit of pleasure brakes the asabiyya down. Furthermore, luxury corrupts the character, through luxury the soul acquiring diverse kinds of evil and sophisticated customs. (Ibn Khaldun: 109, 135, 138.)

The new riches obtained by center-*hadhari* extension of power would lead to economic and political cleavages in society, and, the weakening of social cohesion, without which a society can not withstand disintegration. According to Ibn Khaldun's theoretical formulation, this historical process recurs constantly. At each certain historical juncture, armed conflict between the power center and one of the peripheral tribal units would lead to the disintegration of the center and the formation of a new order. And, this had persistently continued for over a millennium.

Ibn Khaldun’s Theory and Dialectics of War and World Order in Modern History

As such, Ibn Khaldun's theoretical scheme can be applied to explicate the nature and mechanism of historical process of formation and re-formation of the world order in modern times by showing the dialectical nature of the relationship between world order and war. This framework can be applied to the European history to show that war has always been interrelated with the predominant form of

European states, and, also with the international order at large. Hence, a triadic interrelationship has persisted between war, economic domination, and international order in the modern history.¹

A. The Early Centuries

The beginning of “Modern European History” is dated by the historians from the Italian Wars of 1494. In fact, there was a continual interaction between the expansion of European enterprise overseas and the internecine conflicts between Europeans themselves. In the sixteenth century Europe, wealth and military capability went hand in hand: *pecunia nervus belli* or as the French phrased it, *pas d’argent, pas de*

Suisses (Howard, 1986: 20 39). Colonial wars of the seventeenth century also indicate the role of economic interests in conflicts and the relationship between wars and politico-economic changes which occurred in Africa and the ‘Americas’. At the turn of the 16th century, the Portuguese developed sea routes rounding Africa to exploit the oriental trade, while Spaniards sought and found a circumglobal route (Frank, 1978: 36).

Portuguese entered the African continent and later in parts of the "new world", namely Brazil. Spaniards, too, had by this time begun to collect precious metal out of Americas to Europe. In the new system, the native ‘Indians’ were used as slaves to work in the mines to excavate the precious metals by which the new European states and economy were constructed. The newly constructed polity and economies of colonial Europe then began to compete with each other and consequently a new international (dis-)order of fierce rivalry overwhelmed Europe. Following these conquests, the English farmers were forced to work in cities for factories which were financed by precious metals coming from the Americas. New Socio-economic structure was created after wars overseas for more of a share of the mines and the domestic strife was created because of destruction of small farmers (Ibid: 40).

Towards the end of the 16th century, the demand for slaves began to turn the capture of

1. Perry Anderson has industriously shown the role of war and slavery for both Greek and Roman Empire. The Greek Civilization and the Greek Empire were, according to Anderson, closely interdependent. Whereas the glorification of the Greek Civilization was due to the Greek empire, the empire could not sustain itself without slavery. Slavery was rendered absolute and dominant in the Greek city-states (Anderson, 1978: 3). The build up of the Roman Empire was also inherently dependent on slavery. There was, however, a major difference between Greek and Roman slavery. Greek agriculture employed slaves widely but was confined to small areas; but the Roman Republic united large agrarian property with gang-slavery in the countryside on a major scale (ibid:60). This mode of production obviously required an enormous number of slaves which were supplied through spectacular series of campaigns (The Punic, Macedonian, Mithridatic and Gallic wars). These wars which were for the purpose of imperial domination of Rome created a wide area of colonized regions which were victimized socially and economically by Roman aggressions (ibid:61).

slaves in Africa into the major business. This was due to the Europeans' need for slaves to work in mines and plantations in America. So, what happened in the beginning of the 16th century was the formation of a "...single world out of many and transforming many to create one" (Ibid, 80). America became, therefore, a part of the European system which now had a wide domain for economic activities and became involved in new series of conflicts, military build-ups, and wars. (See Table 1)

B. Economic Competition and War in 18th Century

The essential elements of empires in the 18th century were: colonies, trade, and sea-power. The interdependence of these three elements was so fundamental that it made the separation of commerce (economic) and warfare (politics) of this period impossible and superficial. This interrelationship can be explained in the light of Ibn Khaldun's theoretical framework. During this period "warships became larger and more heavily armed (Development in British shipping in the late 17th century is an example) (Williams, 1966: 32). Slave trade became a dominant factor on the 18th century international economy and spontaneously a cause of conflicts. Two major characteristics of this century which distinguish it from other centuries are the Industrial Revolution and overseas wars. These two phenomena, however, were closely interrelated with each other.

Another fact is that the outcomes of continental wars (among major European powers) were in direct relationship to their possessions in the new world. This clearly manifests the role that outward expansion had on the relationship among European powers, particularly regarding wars among them and internal changes there. Another difference that existed was the position of actors of wars in the European continent.

One of the significant results of the 17th century's developments was the emergence of Britain as a major power. This, itself, had great effects on the international system. The riches of the new world played a significant role on the British economy. During the first half of the 18th century, the British economy witnessed a relative shift of emphasis to domestic manufacturing and an expansion into new products. The increasing demand from the mining regions of Brazil and Spanish America, from the plantations of the Caribbean, and from the American South and Northeast supported this expansion of British manufacture, as did the import of certain British manufacturers by Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Baltic areas (Ibid).

In other words, England started to change by two ways: internal production and external trade. So, the outward expansion and inward production system were very much interrelated. This also had some other effects. Both, in France and England, there were lauded interests

which were supporting a European or continental oriented policy. However, the manufacturing interests had other plans, specifically colonial expansion. This conflict was resolved in England with the domination of the latter group after the Glorious Revolution. This led to colonial rivalries, conflicts, and wars. France, however, due to its powerful landed interest could not resolve this conflict until the end of the 18th century and this is why through the 18th century France failed to generate any substantial overseas migration by 1763, French territories had about 70,000 whites whereas English colonies about 2.5 million (Frank: 106). This, however, does not mean that the French colonial policies were prescribed.

France was an Empire of colonies and trade supported by the enlarged mercantile marine which Colbert had left behind and backed by the most re-doubtable military forces in Europe. By the second half of the 17th century, it became evident that the French and British expansions in North America were on a collision course. Then, clashes between their subjects overseas would, too, have been difficult to avoid. By the end of the 17th century, the rising power of France offered a strong challenge to the fast growing British overseas empire (Williams, 25). Finally, 1689 saw the outbreak of the first of a series of European war lasting until 1815.

Regarding the relationship between the 18th century wars and colonial expansion of this century, Dorn says:

. . . among recent historians, especially in Great Britain and America, a tendency has arisen to belittle the importance of war as a contributing force in the building up of modern nations (yet) for good or for evil, militarism became one of the constituent elements of European civilization at the very time when European influence was being extended over the rest of the world. It is a notorious fact, that the history of colonial expansion is also the history of incessant warfare" (Dorn, in Frank, 107).

The war of Spanish succession is one among many evidences to support Dorn's theory up to this time (1702-1713). France was the dominant power in Europe. However, as the result of this war Britain emerged as the dominant power in Europe and a new phase in colonial rivalry began. France and Spain, who were defeated in the war, came to be close allies in their challenge to the British supremacy. This supremacy also had other significance besides competition overseas. By the treaty of Utrecht, Britain received the "asiento" right (to supply the Spanish colonies with a certain number of slaves and the privilege of a "naïve de permiso" to call on Spanish colonial parts, which up to that time had been closed to her). This had a significant impact on domestic production. New

markets were opened to British exporters. Also at that time, Brazilian gold entered England through Portugal after the 1703 Treaty and England got access to the growing Brazilian market. Britain, which so far, had the Brazilian market and gold now gained vast Spanish colonies and French-North American colonies opened up to its growing-market oriented industrial goods. This then provided necessary base for the development of the Industrial Revolution along which came British political supremacy for the next 150 years. The result of the War of Spanish Succession was the termination of French dominance in Europe (Bernstein & Green, 1976:33).

C. Seven Years' War and Birth of America

Another significant event of the 18th century was the Seven Years' War, the result of which had a significant role to play in another event in this century, the American Revolution. The background of the Seven Years' War goes back to the depression in the English West Indies which affected too many British English interests to be tolerated; hence, truculent trade rivalry was welcomed as a possible solution to commercial problems. During 1720s and 1730s, the British sugar industry in the West Indies experienced a severe depression due to levelling off in exports to Europe and the growing trade between New England and the French West Indies. These led to the war of the Austrian succession. About this war, Williams says:

"The real significance of the war was that it was the first major conflict between European powers fought because of their overseas disputes" (Williams, 1966:63). Referring to the conflicts and wars between England and France, Parry and Sherlock say:

Each side hoped not to acquire and exploit the enemy's colonies but to destroy and depopulate them. . . . Failing the destruction of the enemy's colonies, the next-best thing was to cut off their trade, starve them of provisions and slaves, and prevent them from selling their sugar. In this war naval activity was, in practice, almost confined to this second type of operation. By 1744 the energies of both combatants were taxed elsewhere, in Europe and North America (Frank, 109).

By 1750s, there was a shift in British policies which was reflected on the Seven Years' War. At this time, the major British intention was the elimination of French strategic threat to the exposed hinterland of the North American colonies which increasingly provided market for British manufacturing exports. These new policies were disabled by British Prime Minister William Pitt (the representative of manufacturing interests) who once said: "When trade is at stake, it is your last entrenchment; you must defend or perish" (Ibid, 110). So, when France supported Austria in her dispute with Prussia, England shifted so sharply from its alliance with Austria to Prussia

"Diplomatic Revolution" (Bernstein & Green, 1976:58). While the war started in Europe and apparently over a continental issue (Austria claiming Selsi back from Prussia) it spread overseas over colonial possessions of France, Spain, and England. This shows how European conflicts and policies were in direct relationship with colonial possessions. France lost North America and India to England. Spain also lost to the British parts of her possessions. After 1763, the British supremacy was all but assured. And once more the social structure of the world started to change drastically (British hegemony - Industrial Revolution and emergence of capitalism).

Prior to 1830s (the emergence of the Industrial Revolution), major powers were constantly involved in war for overseas possessions. The main reason for which was the prevalence of mercantilism and the need for precious metals to trade with the Orient from 1600s to 1830s (Szymanski, 1981). But from 1830s, the need for exporting goods and importing raw materials for the industries was the dominant factor. Henceforth, the major powers were far more involved in balance of power wars during the 1600s-1815 and more involved in imperial wars during 1815-1900. (See Table 2)

Generally speaking, colonies proved to be a vast financial burden. Individuals and corporations often prospered, but the cost of

military and naval establishment was on the shoulder of the nation as a whole. On the other hand, the "need" for-external markets led to the creation of a new socioeconomic structure in the overseas countries which had to be shaped in such a way that could absorb European goods.

To make the African and Asian countries consumers of the European goods, a new socioeconomic structure had to be established and consequently a political structure suitable to it was needed. These changes proceeded the emergence of a totally new international system which in turn pre-conditioned a new form of conflicts in the 20th century.

D. Pre-conditions of World War I

In their analysis of the genesis and nature of capitalism, Marx and Engels invited attentions to the role of war. As they saw it:

The cheap prices of [the bourgeoisie's] commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces "the barbarians" intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. (Marx and Engle's, 1967: 224)

So, according to Barkawi, it "was apparently with metaphorical heavy artillery that the bourgeoisie created 'a world after its own image'." Force and war have their own logics. In the decisive campaign of the first Opium War (1839-1842), by the standards of the time, a considerable expeditionary force was applied

(Barkawi, 2004:165). As the result

The defeated Chinese state was forced to sign a number of unequal treaties with the British and other European powers which sought to facilitate the expansion and deepening of circuits of merchant capital (Cain and Hopkins, 2002:362-8).

Afterwards, a pliant Chinese government was supported against internal uprisings which themselves were generated mainly "by the increased presence of the Europeans and their products." This then led to further violent interventions by the Europeans in the following decades (Barkawi, 2004:158). And, it was the struggle for a greater share in the new international system which finally ended up with WWI.

By 1880, the great increase in the productivity of European industry placed pressure on each of the powers to find new markets for their excess capacity. The need for raw materials was also a consideration. The result of this situation was two-fold: desire for more overseas conquests; and a new cycle of protectionism that began in 1870s which itself helped intensify the race for the colonies' (because of the lack of markets in the continent).

Britain and France who had legacy of the 18th century dominance were far ahead of Germany on their colonial possessions. In 1870, France controlled approximately 17.100 square

miles and England had around nine million square miles when Germany had no colonial possessions until 1884. That year, she acquired her first colonies. Both England and France continued their acquisition of foreign lands on a growing rate whereas Germany did not. This, however, happened when the iron and steel production was growing in Germany. During 1870 to 1900, the German economy expanded twice the rate of France and surpassed England by 1900 (Choucri & North, 1975:58). Choucri and North describe the situation as follows: "Although Germany enjoyed great economic success in the mid-nineteenth century, she may have considered herself at a disadvantage in comparing herself with the empires of other nations. Rapidly growing German industries, "one of the wonders of economic history" created new demands for raw material and markets (Choucri & North, 1978:56). This situation coincided with the constantly diminishing area of unclaimed colonial territory, without which, the possession of raw material and market for manufactured goods was practically impossible. While throughout this period (1870-1900) there was no "balance of power", wars were constantly fought by imperial powers. After 1882, France was engaged almost constantly in some overseas war. Of the 45 years between 1870 and 1914 only nine were relatively tranquil. During the same period, there were only three years when

Britain was not involved in at least one war over the acquisition or maintenance of territories. Obviously, Germany was much less involved in violence due to her inactive presence (she was unified in 1870), compared to England and France on possessing colonies (Choucri & North, 1975:42). On the other side of Europe, Austrian industrial production and trade were growing. But the empire was not expanding territorially as other powers were. When the decline of Ottoman brought up the opportunity for expansion to Austria, Russian imperial policy encroached Austrian plans and this destabilized the situation more (Choucri & North, 1975:52).

E. War in Age of Globalization

Like the social science itself, which has ignored the issue of war, in globalization studies too, notwithstanding, certain important exceptions, relatively little attention is paid to war. This is the case despite the frequency of armed conflict since 1989. The neo-liberal perspective is a clear case in such lack of attention. In neo-liberal formulation, “globalization is seen as considerably ameliorating the problem of war among nation-states”(Weede, 2003, in Barkawi,156). Such reading is, however, blind to the roles of the state and coercive power in creating and maintaining a free trading world.

The most sophisticated discussions of globalization are found among social and cultural theorists who have paid relatively little

explicit attention to war or even other political violence. This is the case while there is a fundamental interrelationship between war and the shaping of a new world order. As Philip Bobbitt has recently argued, major war between great powers is productive of new international orders. (Ibid,163) In fact, it can be claimed that in a way, war is itself “a globalising force”. If globalization refers to the international relations of connection and constitution, war is a significant dimension of these relations. Globalization draws our attention centrally and specifically to the domain of interconnection, to interactive processes and their consequences. War works its effects precisely through interconnection. ‘Globalization’ can be taken as referring to the ‘thick’ set of mutually constitutive international relations out of which apparently discrete entities such as nation-states are produced, reproduced and transformed. War and its related social and cultural processes are significant components of this field of mutually constitutive relations (Barkawi, 2004:162).

As wars and conflicts up through the 18th century were pre-condition for what happened in the 19th century, the colonial legacy of the 19th and early 20th century are the preconditions of what has taken place in the twentieth century. The political and economic systems, as well as wars and revolution of the Twentieth century were the direct consequences of the effects of colonialism in the 19th century.

The absence of major power conflicts, the emergence of the third world revolutions, and the dominance of the multinational corporations were all related to each other and directly linked to the 19th century - early 20th century colonialism, rivalry, and wars. One of the most significant results of the 19th century colonialism in the world was the establishment of a certain form of social structure in the peripheral countries. The structure which facilitated the penetration of MNC's into the peripheries and created a situation for a semi-unified centre in the 20th century. Because of internationalization of production, market and division of labour and emergence of trilateralism two major consequences resulted: first, a unified centre and secondly, a dependent periphery (as a whole). In the following pages, we will try to see the factors involved in this situation.

Post-World War II era can be distinguished from the rest of the history by its three-dimensional characteristic:

1. Relative stability inside and amongst centre countries (non-violent change of governments, no "balance of power" wars).
2. Relative instability and persistence of violent change inside the periphery (violent oppression, civil wars, coup de' tat, and revolutions).
3. Violent conflicts between the centre on the one side and the periphery on the other. This situation existed as a result of two interrelated

factors: the new international economic system, and the legacy of the 19th century.

While throughout the 19th century the periphery was external to western economic systems and became a part of it only through military conquest; in the post 1945 era, the system has transformed through a process contending two contradictory directions. The periphery, while becoming geographically separated from the centre via independence movement, had become structurally integrated into the new world system dominated by multinational corporations-due to socioeconomic structures established in these countries by colonial powers. This integration has reached to a stage where it becomes impossible to distinguish between national and international economy. This international integration has been reached differently in different parts (mainly two parts, "developing" and poor) of the periphery. In one segment of the periphery it has been accomplished through a two-dimensional mechanism.

To see how centre countries, in which multinational corporations are present, stand in relation to each other and to periphery, we can compare the rates of profit that MNCs make in periphery than in the centre. Data show that the same MNC's make higher profits in periphery than in the carter. And considering that centres are exporting goods to periphery through MNCs leads us to believe that there is a transfer of

wealth from the periphery "as a whole" to the centre "as a whole" which has consequently led to cooperation (I call it unification) of the centre and their domination over periphery.

In relation to other parts of the periphery, a different method is being used. Here the international lending agencies play the crucial role. Agencies like IMF and World Bank lend money to those countries which have a "favourable" relation with the centre countries. It is abstemiously enough that among the thirty-eight poorest countries, all except two others have previously been colonized (the legacy of the colonialism in 19th century). Now, instead of military conquest, they are brought into the system through "loans" which have enough political and economic attachments to them that the national economy has to adopt itself to requirements of IMF and World Bank which preclude its being national policy any more. These agencies can help topple those governments who are badly dependent on the loans by holding the loan from them (Chile, Jamaica), they can rush in to support right-wing military governments after a coup (Argentina, Turkey), they can reward governments that become more hospitable to MNC's (Yugoslavia, China) and they can, in general, impose conditions on each borrower to make it safe for the later investments of private capital (Franklin, 1982).

As a result of this new system of

international integration (non-military conquest), new forms of political interactions-conflicts have emerged. In the periphery, there is not any "visible" national enemy to fight against. For the "enemy" has the "national" economy in its hands (through the elites of the periphery) but there is no foreign troops across the border or inside the country.

Henceforth, the anti-nation is inside the nation. The most frequent outcome of this situation has been "riot". From 1945, there has been a direct relationship between riots in periphery and centre's intervention in these countries. In other words, attempts to change the status quo in periphery (including the change of the existing government in the periphery) have been resisted by centre countries. During this period, riots in 22 "independent states" led to foreign intervention (see Table 3). Nevertheless, in several cases, the internal changes have led to revolutions which have had profound impacts on the international system (China, Cuba, Iran, etc.).

The most developed states in the international system—the United States, Western Europe, and Japan—form what Karl Deutsch called a security community, which is a group of countries among which war is unthinkable. These states are the most powerful ones in the world and, so, are traditional rivals. Thus, the change is striking and consequential. Constructivists explain this in terms of changed

ideas and identities; liberals point to democracy and economic interest; realists stress the role of nuclear weapons and American hegemony. My own explanation combines the high cost of war, the gains from peace, and the values that are prevalent within the security community. Whatever the cause, the existence of the community will bring with it major changes in international politics and calls into question many traditional theories of war (Jervis, 2002: 11).

First, is the new division of labour: the multinationals have exported jobs from centre to periphery to produce parts of goods in different regions of the world by cheap labour. Disparities of around ten times on the wage level between centre and periphery for the same jobs are typical (Szymanski, 1981:137). Second, is penetration in the "national" economies of the peripheral countries? While the local worker is working for a foreign employer, the main source for foreign companies' "investment" is local money. (Table 4-a)

This situation has resulted in the transfer of wealth from the periphery to the centre. In 1977, the total input to the less developed countries from the trans-national corporations and banks was \$78 billion. On the other hand, a total of \$114.8 billion transferred from the less developed to the developed countries. This represented a net transfer of \$36.8 billion from the less-developed to the developed countries

(Szymanski, 1981:301). This transfer of wealth has been accomplished through an economic triangle. Elements of this triangle are centre (advanced countries) MNCs, and periphery (developing, less developed countries). The same MNCs which are having investment in the periphery are investing in different parts of the centre. Many MNCs' subsidiaries export goods to other parts of the world and these exports form a part of centre countries' GNP (See Table 5).

Conclusion

Ibn Khaldun's *Elm al Umran* has considerable potentials to help explicating significant issues and subjects in the realm of human history and complexities of social life. War and its relationship with human history, which has been practically ignored by modern social theory can be better understood when Ibn Khaldun's theory is appropriately applied. Invoking his theory of social change helps to explain the role of war in the formation and disintegration of the world order over the past four centuries. According to his analytical framework, it is not a historical necessity that has led to the formation of various world orders, but actually, it has been the war among nations which had implications on international and world plane. Therefore, it can be claimed that the capitalist world order is the dialectical outcome of the role that is played by wars. In other words, wars have not taken place in the

midst of certain international net of relationships, but have actually been provoked by the necessities of existing orders and at the same time have resulted in the change of the same order from which they emerged. This can be understood and proved to be so by the assistance of the Khaldunian theory of change, according to which, war is considered to be a significant factor, as has actually happened in the history. Such observations and implications can be at the service of the evolving global order. As we can observe that war with periphery of the world is repeatedly happening in the age of global order.

As a heuristic means, Ibn Khaldun's dialectical approach to war is explanatory tool for the explication of the origin and consequences of war in European history. The European international "order" as a system has been repeatedly restructured as the result of war. Each time the established order has from within itself bred new type of war as the result of which again a new order has come about. In the pre-capitalist mode of production of the 16th century, when international trade was important, there was competition over trade routes and this led to the "discovery" of Latin America as a limited source for enlargement of trade. This eventually led to a series of wars in Europe over the possession of overseas colonies. So in this period we observe many "balance of power" wars. However, in the

capitalist mode of production, which came about after the Industrial Revolution (as a result of the transfer of Latin American precious metal), the expansion on the world scale raised new opportunities for contestants to expand their interests; therefore, we observe more "imperial wars" in this period. Then, because of the need for a market to sell goods and export capital, while there was a limit on the possession, a major 'balance of power' emerged.

In the 20th century, however, because of integration of all parts of the 'free world', and in the absence of "national economy" and with the dominance of MNC's over the 'world economy', there is neither "balance of power" wars, nor "imperial wars" but there are revolutions, coup de tat, and centre versus periphery wars. At the present historical juncture also, the process of globalization has become concurrent with a notion and threat of civilizational war. The thought of such a war has been theorised by Samuel Huntington as of the "clash of civilizations".

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استدلال جنگ و نظام جهانی

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هدف این مقاله بکارگیری "دیالکتیک عصبیت" ابن خلدون برای تبیین سرشت رابطه جنگ با نظام جهانی در عصر مدرن با ابتناء به مشاهدات "تغییرات کلان-ساختار تاریخی" است. بحث اصلی این مقاله این است که تغییرات کلان، مشخصاً تغییر در "نظم جهانی"، رابطه ای دیالکتیکی با جنگ داشته است. تاریخ نگاری شاخص ابن خلدون امکان تحلیل چگونگی رابطه جنگ با توزیع قدرت و تغییر در این توزیع قدرت در سطح جهانی را در اختیار می گذارد. "علم عمران" وی ظرفیت تبیینی بالائی برای توضیح نسبت جنگ با نظم جهانی دارد. در این مقاله تلاش شده است که با استفاده از این نظریه، اهمیت تاریخی و ساختاری جنگ برای شکل گیری و از پاشیدن نظامهای جهانی از قرن شانزده میلادی به این سو در چارچوب مفهومی که در علم عمران ابن خلدون نهفته است، نشان داده شود.

واژگان کلیدی: جنگ، نظام جهانی، دیالکتیک، علم عمران، ابن - خلدون

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