



Received: 2022/10/13
Accepted: 2023/07/5
Published: 2023/09/01

¹MA in History of Iran,
Department of History,
University of Sistan and
Baluchistan, Iran
E-mail:
hamid.balouchi1371@gmail.com

² Associate Professor,
Department of History, Faculty
of Literature and Humanities,
University of Sistan and
Baluchistan,
Iran.(Corresponding author)
E-mail: salehi@lihu.usb.ac.ir

How to cite this article:
Balochi, Hamid, Salehi, Kurosh.
(2023). The Passivity of Safavid
Government in the
Concentration of Power: From
the Defeat in the Battle of
Chaldiran to the End of Sultan
Mohammad Khodabandeh's
Reign, *The International Journal
of Humanities* (2023) Vol. 30 (4):
(94-112).

RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Passivity of Safavid Government in the Concentration of Power: From the Defeat in the Battle of Chaldiran to the End of Sultan Mohammad Khodabandeh's Reign

Hamid Balochi¹  Kurosh Salehi² 

Abstract: After losing the Battle of Chaldiran, the Safavid administration had a difficult time in integrating the al-Tawaifi court system under the central authority. Feudalism of Shah Ismail was able to subjugate the local authorities and unify a portion of Iran's territory with the help of the Qizilbash force. Due to territorial and theological disputes, the Safavids and two Ottoman and Uzbek kingdoms engaged in several conflicts as a result of making Shī'ism as official faith in Iran. Following the Safavids' loss at Chaldiran, centrifugal (local) forces became more powerful and eclipsed the influence of numerous rulers. The Safavid era turned out to be significant historically. The study's findings indicate that the central Safavid government faced a significant challenge in concentrating power following the defeat at Chaldiran, and this challenge persisted with only a minor variation during later kings until the end of Mohammad Khodabandeh's reign.

Keywords: Safavid Government; Shah Ismail I; Battle of Chaldiran; Divergence; Qizilbash Force.

Introduction

The Safavid dynasty came to power following the demise of Sasanian, and the succession was seen by the Iranian society as a cornerstone of a new form of governance. Numerous tribes and areas were able to gain some degree of autonomy and legitimacy in the shape of the emirates of Istiqfa and Astila, which were recognized by the caliphate's spiritual institution. The Safavids were successful in unifying a sizeable portion of ancient Iranian territory and establishing the central government's sway over it. Prior to the Safavid government, there was a continuous tug-of-war between the centralization of the government and the decentralization of local and tribal resources, in both overt and covert ways. This tug-of-war was evident in the economic and political life of different regions of Iran. Additionally, it had sparked several conflicts aimed at controlling agricultural lands, pastures, and farms. After the death of Timur Gorkani, the trend of centripetal force accelerated and peaked during the reign of Aq Qoyunlu. In fact, the rise of Sheikh Safi al-Din Ardabili's movement and the formation of the Safavid state gave way to a strong framework for the centralized and integrated government on Sufi-Shī'a ideologies. The Qizilbash tribes and the assistance of their leaders in the foundation of the Safavid administration caused monarchs to transfer numerous key posts (military and civil officials) to them.

The Safavid government reacted when the foundation of the government were being integrated and strengthened, various commanders and elements of the Qizilbash force were split up in an effort to gain more influence and to be closer to the king. This led to a battle incurred suffering and other losses to the Safavid rule. Since its establishment, the Safavid rulers were worried about Qizilbash's growing influence and took several measures to tame their eccentricity. However, the first step from Shah Ismail to Shah Abbas did not succeed. Shah Ismail had won all of his battles except Chaldiran, which he lost to the Ottomans. That was the time the Concentration Crisis in the dynasty started, and its central government's foundations were shaken.

This study tries to respond to the question: "What were the reasons behind the Safavid government's failure to concentrate power after the defeat in Chaldiran until the end of Mohammad Khodabande's reign?" A historical research method along with descriptive analysis has been used in this study. It examines the problem, and in response, a research hypothesis is found i.e. the Safavid government's inaction due to the impact of Chaldiran's defeat on the material and spiritual realms and the emergence of centrifugal forces like Qizilbash and KhaninMutard weakened its capacity to concentrate power.

It should be noted that no specialized article or book is written on this subject except some passing remarks in some previous studies. Ali Ghasemi and Ali Taheri analyzed the ups and downs of Atabakan Lurkocheh's political connections with the Safavid administration during the years 907 and 1006 AH/1501 and 1597 AD. Investigating the political ties between the Safavid and the Ardalan governors in 2019 (Fereydon Nouri, Hossein Mirjafari, and Ali Akbar Kajbaf 2013); A review of the Qalandaran uprisings during Mohammad Khodabandeh (Hossein Eskandari, and Hamid Asadpour in 2016); Chaldiran and its function in Safavid-era Iran's foreign policy (Elham Chavushzadeh and Mohsen Najafzadeh, 2013); Historical Sociology of the State: Disruption in the Connection of the Elites and the Construction of the State in the Safavid Era (Naser Jamalzadeh, Ahmad Darshi); Struggle and ethnic conflict between Turkish and Tajik components in the Safavid era (from Shah Tahmasab until the end of Safavid reign); Abbas Sarafrazi discusses how the Taklu clan helped strengthen and damage the Safavid administration up to Shah Abbas I's death; Zahra Rezaei, NaserJadidi, Mohammad Karim Yusuf Jamali, 2020, and Mohammad Karim Yusuf Jamali might be noted in relation to the function of Qizilbash force in deciding the succession of Safavid rulers from the beginning until the end of Shah Abbas (1501 and 1631 AD/907-1038 AH).

The study is innovative in the sense that it analyzes the Safavid government's interactions with local power centers and, to some degree, its avoidance and inactivity after the Battle of Chaldiran's to the end of Sultan Mohammad Khodabande's reign.

The Safavid government was founded on the exiting traditions but because of rituals and beliefs it promoted, it was forced to establish and maintain a centralized structure. However, the events after Chaldiran's defeat resulted in small but significant changes. The majority of forces forming the Safavid power turned to decentralization and partially eclipsed the authority of the Shah and the central government. Shah Tehamasab did not have much control over the local powers during the first decade of his rule after Shah Ismail I. However, during the second decade, he was able to create a balance between Turkish (Qizilbash) and Tajik (Iranian) forces. However, in the later year until the arrival of Shah Abbas I, centrifugal forces were able to increase their power, which led to the assassination of Shah Ismail II, Mahd-e Olia, and Hamzeh Mirza; and also the Qizilbash could dethrone Shah Mohammad Khoda Bandeh and help Abas Mirza reach the power and become king.

Traditional Divergence or Centripetalism

Decentralization is the use of diverse functions from the institutional hub of a society's activity out to the margins (Manor, 1999: p. 1/ Tausz, 2002: p. xv). According to the political concept of decentralization, national and local affairs are managed by local organizations that are established outside the purview of the activities of the central government organization, rather than by a single administrative and political organization as is the case with centralization (Nabawe, 1973: 41). Absolute centralization is dangerous because it can lead to the collapse of the central government, the division of a single government into multiple ones, the expulsion of a unit from the government, the emergence of an independent government, and the establishment of a government without a central authority. Dropping the government's ability and competency in carrying out duties result in a loss of attention and a lack of concentration in the most basic type of organization (Taheri, 1993:115). All national decisions are made locally under a decentralized system of government, which has both benefits and drawbacks depending on the time period.

In a decentralized society, local forces will seek independence to further the interests of the family, tribe, or country if they lack the required political development. The relative lack of focus is to delegate local responsibilities to locally elected authorities, with the intention of using local technical, political-cultural, and social reasons in alignment with broader national and international objectives (Abul Hamad, 1997, Vol. 1: 63).

Shah Ismail and Consolidation of Safavid Authority

Shah Ismail was born in 1487 AD/892 A.H. When he was a year old, his father passed away. After Haydar's passing, the Safavid Sufis in Ardabil selected his oldest son (Ali) to take over as their leader, and Ali's support grew steadily over time (Nawai, 2013: 57). In the middle of the struggles amongst the AqQuyunluamirs, Sulaiman Beg was still Baisanqar Mirza known as a kingdom and traveled to Tabriz, where he hoisted the flag of freedom. Ali, Ismail, and Ibrahim, three of Hayder's sons, were captured and sent to Shiraz by the command of Sultan Yaqoob (Khand Mir, 1353, vol.434-436). After eliminating his competitors, Rostam Beg let Hayder's sons to rule the Safavid faction once again in Ardabil. Rostam Beg was worried about the Safavid authorities acquiring control as their fanatical following grew. To keep the three brothers from seeing Qizilbash, he summoned them to Tabriz and appointed someone to look after them. This, however, did not succeed, and Rostam Beg decided to assassinate Sultan Ali. Ali, along with his brothers and other Sufis including Dede Beg Talesh, Qara Piri Beg, and Ilyas Beg Jamalgi, escaped to Ardabil (Alam-

ara-yeSafavi, 1984: 36). Sultan Ali, who had just passed away, put his crown on Ismail's head, commanded the Sufi princes to guard him, and selected seven of the chosen ones (Ahl al-Ehjah), Hossein Beg Laleh, and Qara Piri Beg Qajar as his protectors. He then picked Abdal Beg (Turkaman, 1998, V 1: 41). In this instance, Karkia Mirza Ali, the king of Lahijan, sent an invitation to Haydar's sons. The two brothers, Ismail and Ibrahim, accepted the invitation and arrived in Lahijan around the beginning of the year 1521/ 900. Shamsuddin Lahiji was ordered to instruct them in the Quran, Persian, and Arabic by Karkia Mirza Ali (Vale Isfahani: 1993: 74 - Khand Mir, V 4: 1974: 441). The elder brother of Ismail, Ibrahim, sought asylum with Aq Qoyunlu Aq Qoyunlu; being the elder brother, he was intended to become the monarch, but he converted to a dervish lifestyle and pursued the path.

While Rostam Beg learnt that Karkia Mirza Ali was there with Hayder's sons, he asked him to surrender. He, however, denied that they were in Lahijan. Ismail ultimately made the decision to get revenge on his forefathers after Rostam Beg perished in the conflict with Ahmad Beg. For his journey, Karkia Mirza Ali supplied the necessities (Ghulam Sarwar, 1995: 42). After defeating Farrokh Yasar Sharvan Shah and Alwand Mirza at Tabriz, Ismail assumed the title of Shah Ismail and ascended to the throne. Sahibdiwan Wazir, Amir Zakaria, and Shamsuddin Lahiji were the men of Hossein Beg Leleh's choice for Sadr, respectively (Nawai, 2010: 67). This marked the start of the Safavid dynasty's consolidation of power up until Shah Ismail assumed the throne of Azerbaijan, where there was no political unification and several kings reigned over various parts. Alvand Mirza had control over Azerbaijan before the dreadful war, but Shah Ismail eventually came into possession of it. The following is how Sahib Ahsan al-Tawarikh met them: Shah Ismail in Azerbaijan and the majority of Iraq, Rais Muhammad in Abargu, Hossein Kian Chalavi in Semnan, Abul Fatah Bayander in Kerman, Murad Beg Bayander in Yazd (Romelu, 1978: 87). Shah Ismail initiated a fight with the aforementioned claims at the outset of his rule. The Safavids defeated Murad Mirza Aq Qoyunlu at Hamedan in 908 A.H. Following this, Ismail peacefully seized control of Iran's major cities. Shah Ismail turned away from moving into eastern Iran after finally defeating Alvand Mirza and beating Murad, instead going toward the center of Uzun Hassan's territory, Diyar Bakr, Ismail moved to the Ottoman state's eastern frontier in this sequence. Ismail noticed Mesopotamia after conquering Azerbaijan and East Asia Minor. This region's conquest started with the seizure of Mardin, Aq Qoyunlu's last stronghold, and ended with the annexation of Baghdad (Roemer, 1991: 255). Shah Ismail dispatched Khalil Beg from

Hamadan to Barik Beg, the ruler of Baghdad, during the invasion of that city in order to demand his surrender. When Barik Beg learnt about Ismail's departure, he escaped to Aleppo. Baghdad was taken without a struggle by Hossein Begalleh, the Safavid army's commander, in 914 A.H. Ismail formally crossed the border into Baghdad before handing up power to Khadim Beg Khalifa. Ismail also began conducting military operations in the southern Khuzestan province. The Musha'ashites who had lived there since 840 A.H. were targeted in a campaign. Iskandar Beg Munshi said that the followers of this sect at the time were led by a man called Sayyed Fayaz and held the belief that Ali (AS) is the fourth caliph of God. Additionally, Seyyed Fayaz, their leader, was recently regarded as God. (MunshiTurkman, 1998: V. 1: 35) In order to depose Malik Shah Rostam, the ruler of Lurestan, Shah Ismail ordered Najmuddin Masoud, Bayram Beg Khorasani, and Hossein Begalleh to Khorramabad while he traveled to Hoveyzeh. In Hoveyzeh, the forces of Qizilbash and Musha'ashites engaged in a bloody conflict. Shah Ismail traveled to Shushtar from Dezful when the Safavids eventually conquered these lands after many of Sultan Fayyaz's allies and he himself were murdered in the conflict (Kasravi, 1983: 44). At the presence of the king in Dezful, he came with the army that he had sent to fight against Malik Rostam. Malik Rostam begged for pardon but continued to dominate. After this battle, Shah Ismail took control of almost all of Aq Qoyunulu's territory. The Uzbeks took advantage of this and advanced towards Khorasan at the time Sultan Hossein Bayqara passed away and the struggle for succession got underway there. When Shah Ismail controlled several territories, those across the river were still held by the ancestors of Sultan Abu Sa'id Timuri. Shibak Khan, the commander of the Uzbek army, began seditious actions and plundering across the river at the same time (Khvandamir, 1974, v. 4: 226).

Shibak Khan then conquered Transoxiana, where he then formed a comparatively strong administration. When Sultan Hussain Mirza learnt about Shibak Khan's invasion, he gave his son Badi' al-Zaman Mirza the command to stop the invader from moving further. But he was unsuccessful. Finally, Sultan Hussain Mirza's sons came together but Shibak Khan triumphed. As a consequence, Khorasan was captured by the Uzbeks, and Sultan Hossein Mirza's sons either perished in battle or sought refuge with nearby monarchs and rulers like Shah Ismail (Khunji, 1996: 174). The conflict between Shah Ismail and Shibak Khan Uzbek was inevitable, according to the themes in the letters that Shah Ismail and Shibak Khan sent to one another. In any case, in 1510 AD/ 916 A.H., Shah Ismail traveled from Soltanieh to Ray and then to Damghan, whose ruler was Shibak Khan's son-in-law. As a result, the Uzbek emperor fled. Shibak Khan was at

Herat at that time. He did not return to Merv after learning of Shah Ismail's departure, instead staying there to fortify the fortress there and await assistance from the Khans he had already asked for across the river. Shah Ismail devised a strategy and moved a few miles away from the fort after learning that Shibak Khan was waiting for help from across the river. Shibak Khan believed that the Shah had traveled to Azerbaijan because there was an uprising taking place. The Safavid army fled in accordance with the predetermined plan, and after Shibak Khan crossed the Black Water in search of Qizilbash force, he destroyed the bridge. The two armies then faced one another behind the river, and the war began with the Uzbek attack. He was cautious for a day or two before leaving the castle, but he did so nevertheless. However, the Qizilbash force prevailed and several Merv citizens were perished in the conflict (Hosseini Estrabadi, 2013: 44). Following his conquest of Merv, Shah Ismail traveled to Herat and took it, after which he made peace with the Uzbeks and established the Oxus River as their shared boundary. (Qazvini, 1984: 313) In 1512 AD /918 AH, Shah Ismail fought the Uzbeks once again. By murdering and pillaging villages across the river and going through Oxus, the Uzbeks broke the peace accord which prompted Shah Ismail to march into Khorasan. After learning this, Uzbek commander Obaidullah Khan escaped to Bukhara. Thus, the Safavid Qizilbash forces' success coincided with Shah Ismail's second conflict with the Uzbeks. However, these successes were not particularly durable since Uzbek invasions persisted after Shah Ismail made his way back, and looting continued until the king's death and the ascension of Shah Tehamaseb I (Hushang Mahdavi, 2012:15). Shah Ismail was able to protect Iran's geographical integrity and national unity after 13 years of war, as well as build a solid wall between India and Ottoman and Uzbek. Shah Ismail led Iran's international relations to become more East and West, or Uzbek and Ottoman, after establishing the Safavid government (Sicker, 2001: 2-3).

Defeat in Chaldiran and Process of Divergence in Safavid Government

Shah Ismail and Bayezid II, Ottoman ruler, had been living contemporarily for eleven years when Ismail took the throne in Tabriz. After Shah Ismail's successes over Iraq, Isfahan, and Fars, Bayezid changed his strategy and adopted a more tolerant one. He dispatched an emissary to Tabriz out of friendliness and congratulated Shah Ismail on his conquests (Falsafi, 1992:16). Although initially he locked the borders and forbade them from passing, Bayezid eventually gave in to Shah Ismail's appeal to let the Sufis enter Iran. He also permitted the Sufis who were in Anatolia to

relocate to Iran. Sultan Salim I succeeded his father in 1512 AD / 918 A.H. after Bayezid II organized a 200,000- army to conquer Iran (Savory, 1980: 25-26). Sultan Salim had two main objectives from the start of his rule: 1) to destroy his opponent Shah Ismail 2) In addition to fulfilling the long-cherished his father to bring the entire Islamic world below one roof (Taheri, 2001:153). With this background, the war was officially began by Safavid provocations in 1514 AD / 920 A.H. Shah Ismail fueled the rebellion and persisted in refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of Sultan Salim's caliphate by sending beheaded Khan Uzbeks (Muhammad Khan Shibani, who was defeated and killed in the battle with the Safavid army in Merv) to the Ottoman court. By doing so, he automatically justified Salim's military action against the Safavids. Salim, on the other hand, had learned that Shah Ismail had irritated the Ottoman foes, the Mamluks of Egypt and the King of Hungary by sending envoys to the Egyptian court (Nawai, 2011: 97). War activities started, and before Salim left, Mohammad Khan Stajlu, the Safavid army's commander, carefully burned every region on his path and applied the scorched earth strategy. However, on first of the month Rajab, 1514 AD /920 A.H., Salim arrived in Chaldiran, in the northwest of Khoi. The Safavids' delusion of power stemmed from the fact that, up until that point, they had never encountered a serious opponent using guns. Instead, they had defeated every adversary by relying on Qizilbash's might and their own selflessness. One of the most significant difficulties was the Safavids' internal successes, both little and significant. These wins largely included Al-Tawaifi monarchs, who were ultimately compelled to bow to the Safavids in the near term whether they wanted to or not. The first conflict between a modernized army with a resolute leadership and the Safavid government's soldiers occurred in the Battle of Chaldiran (Ddara, Tolume, 2022: 92). In the war that ensued, the Safavids were defeated because of the great sacrifices made by the Qizilbash force and the strength of many they lost in this war (Matthee, 1991: 389). This defeat can be traced back to the conversations of Shah Ismail's advisors before the war and the illusion that absolute victory in all wars was created. It cost them a lot of money and reputation (Savory, 1980: 30). The enthusiasm of Safavid forces was lost following their defeat against the Ottomans in this war, and Shah Ismail himself inadvertently suffered as a result. He was observed ignoring his work. The Shah's morals and behavior were greatly affected by Chaldiran's failure, and his pride was replaced by hopelessness, boredom, and failure (Falsafi, 1992: 122). He never again oversaw his troops during the final ten years of rule. The Qizilbash lost faith in their leader as a divine or semi-divine being after the defeat in Chaldiran because they thought they were now invincible and crucial link

separated mentor and disciple. Even though they were given the title of mentor, the Qizilbash still referred to their leader by that name (Savory, 2008: 395). In actuality, religion was incorporated into the government under Shah Ismail. And the policy was set up so that the Shah was regarded as the ideal role model and head of the religious institution in addition to being the head of the government institution (Romelu, 1978: 88). Being slain in the service of one of these two was also seen as a blessing. Belief in religion and devotion to the monarch were the two main foundations of people's attitude towards the king (Alam-ara-ye Safavi, 1984: 384). Following Chaldiran's loss, Ismail left the government, which provided other officials with an opportunity to gain more authority. The fight of Chaldiran resulted in the deaths of several top ranking Qizilbash officers, which greatly altered Safavid troops' focus and cohesion. In 1551 AD/ 930 A.H., Shah Ismail became sick while hunting in Georgia. He returned and healed in Ardabil, and resumed his trip. Unfortunately, he became sick on the road and passed away in Tabriz in 1551AD/ 930 AH. He was buried in Ardabil (Roimir, 2001: 301 - Savory, 2008: 399). Two distinct phases may be distinguished in Shah Ismail's reign: the first phase is prior to Chaldiran's loss: at that point, the Shī'a validity was taken into account along with the zeal, devotion to his followers (Abisaab, 2004) and belief in the repression of internal adversaries. During this time, several wins were also attained (Savory, 2003: 440). The second stage: after Chaldiran's loss, which saw significant changes as a result of the fall in Shah Ismail's spirit and supporters' faith (Aghajari, 2009: 65). Shah Ismail's failure at Chaldiran led to a lack of focus, and the Qizilbash forces (QezalbaShī'ans) moved to boosting their strength and centrism (Lockhart, 1959: 89). An unsuccessful attempt was made to incorporate the Safavid "Tariqat" Sufi organization into the administrative structure during the reign of Shah Ismail, but with the defeat in Chaldiran, this combination was not realized, and the conditions for the ascent to power of the Qizilbash force's claimants and those of centrist forces were set.

The Conquest of Powerful Clans during Shah Tehamasab

Shah Tehamasab's reign may be divided into two: 1551-1561AD/ 930-940 AH and 1561-1605AD/ 940-984 AH. His youth and consequent lack of experience as a king were key aspects of his early reign. The Safavid administration was greatly influenced during this time by Qizilbash emirs and tribal leaders, who essentially seized political control. In addition to succeeding his father, Shah Tehamasab was also regarded as the guru of Qizilbash Sufis, yet he was unable to

conduct himself in the manner of a monarch. During this time, rivalry and warfare among Qizilbash forces began to develop. Then, Qizilbash force was engaged in conflict with one another on securing political, economic, and judicial concessions (SefatGol, 2010: 44) and usurped the king's authority for ten years while in charge of the activities of the government. Diw Sultan Rumlu, one of the emirs of Qizilbash, called other emirs to a meeting of clans. Most of the heads of the Rumlu, Taklu, and Du'lQadr tribes concurred to recognize Diw Sultan as their leader during this assembly, where Diw Sultan Rumlu presented the will of the deceased Shah based on his election as Amir al-Omarai of Shah Tehamasab. However, some of the tribal leaders under the command of Kapak-Sultan protested the new viceroy. However, the parties were at peace after the job was finished. After that, Rumlu, Tekhlu, and Stajlu joined forces to administer the nation while Tehamasab retained the title of Shah. However, this union also disintegrated quickly, and Joha Sultan finally gained control of the government on his own. The monarch was also enraged by Joha Sultan and certain tribal people. The functionality of the divans was another issue under Shah Tehamasab. Iran's judicial and administrative institutions have always been administered by Iranian justices. This practice was maintained even while Turks and Mongols were part of Iran's governmental structure. The outcome of this was the emergence of a new issue in the Iranian legal and political system, even if the divans were Iranian and the military ranks were mostly held by Turks and Mongols. In the quest for control, Iranian military leaders and clergy sometimes clashed. The patriarchal motif of the Qizilbash force clans significantly undermined the notion of the political system that Iranian divans typically functioned around. Although the support of Sufi beliefs may have contributed to the Qizilbash forces' apparent ideological unity, it appears that this aspect of Sufi Qizilbash faded after the establishment of the Safavid government, particularly during the reign of Shah Tehamasab I, and dynastic and clan rivalries resurfaced. The engaged Qizilbash forces stressed their links to their tribe, which contrasted with the inclination of the bureaucracy to be centralist. Qizilbash chiefs immediately attempted to resume their position at the beginning of Shah Tehamasab's rule, but this resulted in fighting amongst Qizilbash clans. In the second phase of his reign, Tahamasab strove to behave more like a true king. Following it, the Qizilbash rebel organizations that had sprung up in various regions were put down (Amoretti, 1986: 649-650). He also put the troops in order. He mandated that members of one of the Qizilbash clans be in charge of daily palace security. He also adopted his father's strategy of assembling a tiny army from the most elite citizens, using the Gurchians group, a regiment of the royal

permanent guards with strength of 5,000, as its fundamental foundation. This led to the conception of an organization, which Shah Abbas later finished (Taheri; 2001: 257). However, near the conclusion of Shah Tehamasab's 52-year rule, indications of the Shah's unwillingness to rule the country came to light. Evidently, taxes rose at the same time that the troops' welfare was being neglected and their paychecks were not being paid on time. Iran's internal condition progressively became worse, and it seems that poverty spread across the country as well as banditry and rioting. Shah Tehamasab became sick starting in 1601/ 981 AH, made a little recovery, and passed away in 984 AH (Iqbal and Pirnia, 1991: 671).

After learning of Shah Ismail's passing and the divisions among the Qizilbash force in the east of the Safavid dominion of Uzbekistan at the start of Shah Tahmasb's reign, they grabbed the chance to go via Oxus and arrive in Khorasan. Ubaidullah Khan's Uzbeks undertook the conquest of Tus before moving on to seize Estrabad. Until Shah Tehamasab raised an army and traveled to Khorasan, Obaidullah Khan continued to advance on Khorasan. They did not withdraw from Uzbekistan, but a few months after Shah Tehamasab departed for Khorasan, and assaulted the region once again. Mashhad was taken by Obaidullah Khan, who then moved directly to Herat. The Safavid lord there submitted and gave the Uzbeks control of the city. When Ubaidullah Khan discovered that Shah Tehamasab was moving towards Khorasan in 1597/ 936 A.H., he left Herat and traveled to Marv to beg the sultan there for assistance. However, they did not agree with Ubaidullah, so he also traveled to Bukhara (Nawai, 1971: 27). Obaidullah Khan, the leader of the Uzbek rebels, was ultimately put down in 946 AH after Shah Tehamasab marched into Khorasan four times in an effort to subdue him. Other Uzbek commanders in the Khorasan area also led rebellions after Obaidullah's death (Shirazi, 1990: 112).

Sultan Salim Osmani, who ruled the western Safavid Empire, passed away in 1547/ 926 A.H. Suleiman the Lawgiver, who had enormous authority and influence and tried to carry on his father's program, succeeded him. He was one of the strong Ottoman rulers, and after learning of Shah Ismail's passing, he insulted Shah Tehamasab in a letter and vowed to conquer and destroy Iran (Hushang Mahdavi, 2012: 28). Suleiman assembled a sizeable army, assumed leadership of it, and designated his chancellor to oversee the other portion of it. In addition, on his journey back from Mesopotamia, he took Baghdad along the same path and established himself there as emperor. The Ottoman force was able to conquer Tabriz and push to Soltanieh. As a result, after 25 years of Iranian occupation, Iraq came under the Ottoman Empire (Foran, 1989: 71-75). Al-Qas-Mirza's

uprising and subsequent refuge in the Ottoman court gave the Ottomans a pretext to invade Iran. Al-Qas-Mirza was the brother of Shah Tehamasab and in command of the governance of the Shirvan region. For the third time, Sultan Suleiman marched into Iran. With an army of 10,000, Shah Tehamasab repelled the Ottoman encroachment, but this battle had no noteworthy outcomes. Al-Qas-Mirza was detained by the Qizilbash force and subsequently executed on Shah Tehamasab's order. Tehamasab was in power during the Ottoman Empire's fourth campaign. He made peace and sent emissaries to the Ottomans because he was fully aware that he lacked the strength to repel the Ottomans' ongoing assaults. Without a formal treaty being signed between the two sides, a peace accord was reached via the movement of diplomats; this arrangement is known as the "Peace of Amasya." Both countries adhered to the peace accord when it was concluded until the end of Shah Tehamasab's rule (Hushang Mahdavi, 2012: 32).

A solid relationship between the Gurkanians of India and the Safavid had been established on the southern side. In the year 1568/ 947 A.H., Humayun, Babur's successor, was unable to quell Shir Khan Suri's uprising and sought asylum with Shah Tehamasab. Tehamasab also pledged to work with him. To put down the insurgents, Tehamasab sent an army to India. The Iranian army triumphed in the conflict, and Humayun was reinstated to the throne. Following this, Humayun asked the Iranian Shah to send some scientists and artists to India. Shah Tehamasab complied with this request, and the scientists sent there played a significant role in the spread of Persian culture and language. Shah Tehamasab dispatched an envoy to Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar who succeeded Humayun, and the two nations' ties were cordial. Shah Tehamasab did not approve of the seizure of Kandahar, so in 1588/ 967 A.H. he dispatched an army to the city and took it, and Akbar Shah terminated his ties to the Iranian court.

This unstable state of affairs inside the Safavid hierarchy was reflected in the political and military climate that governed international relations and frontiers. In general, it can be said that the Safavid government during the rule of Shah Tehamasab I was still in the process of developing, with civil wars wreaking havoc on the country and producing significant confusion and chaos, but Shah Tehamasab, who oversaw this situation for about ten years, managed to keep things under control. After suffering, he made the decision to seize the initiative. Despite several wars and the Qizilbash forces' revolt against the Safavid government's centralization and quest for dominance, Tehamasab's reign was successful.

The Collapse of Authority of Centripetal Forces during Shah Ismail II

When Shah Tehamasab passed away, the Safavid government's internal situation began to fall apart, and the succession conflict amongst the emirs had begun two years before, when the shah was sick. Stajlous, who at this time were thought of as the major refuge of the government, desired the rule of Heydar Mirza under the direction and control of Hossein Beg Yuzbashi. With the backing of Pari Khan-Khanam, sister of Shah Tehamasab, and other Qizilbash, who held the post of Caliph-al-Khalfai, Hossein-Qalikhan Rumlu sought the entrance of Ismail Mirzai, who had been kept in Qahgahe Castle for a while on the order of Shah Tehamasab. Ismail entered the kingdom as Shah Ismail II amid these struggles, and throughout his brief rule, he started to settle tense political scenarios within the Safavid administration. The specific cause of his violence and savagery remained unknown, but it's possible that his distrust and skepticism of a society rife with political conspiracies served as his driving force since he too had shared the throne with these schemes. He had also spent almost twenty years of his life in jail, which had a significant effect on his mood (Nawai, 2011, 149). Many of those who served his father and officials who opposed him were murdered or fired by Shah Ismail II. Then, in an effort to rid the kingdom of the royal family and its numerous bearers and other sons, he began to murder them, while also making an effort to improve the general atmosphere of the nation, which had been mostly overtaken by instability and turmoil prior to his rule. The caravans were targeted by robbers and the routes were dangerous. Therefore, farmers, craftsmen, and merchants looked for changes in the legal and judicial systems when he ascended to the throne. In order to lessen the discontent of farmers and townsfolk, Ismail ordered bandits to be apprehended and punished. He also ordered the establishment of a court to hear the people's tax grievances (Hines, 1992, 112). Even though he initially paid attention to national events, his attention was diverted by the concerns of the nobility and the court, causing him to lose track of international and domestic affairs (Munshi Turkman, 1998, V 1: 21). The Qizilbash force attempted to plot his assassination because Ismail II's conduct generally led the Qizilbash people and the people to believe that he is not a ruler from whom they can aspire to improve.

Shah Mohammad Khodabandeh and Disruption in Concentration of Safavid Power

While internal conflicts following Shah Ismail II reached their peak during the reign of Shah Mohammad Khodabandeh, the importance of centrifugal forces became abundantly clear. At this

point, Parikhan Khanum and Minister Salman Jabri invited the leaders of Qizilbash force to unity and harmony. During the consultation meeting held inside the palace, they initially proposed that Shah Shoja, the young son of Shah Ismail II, succeed him as viceroy and take over the running of the country (Bakhshi Ostad, Heidari, 2021: 12-20). This proposal was rejected. The succession of Sultan Mohammad Mirza (Mohammed Khudabandeh) was suggested by a few of Qizilbash elders, notably Amir Khan and Pir Mohammad Khan; as a result, he was able to ascend to the throne in 1606/985 AH. Since he was blind, Mahd-e Olia took over the administration, and Hamza-Mirza, his eleven-year-old son, was chosen to serve as the crown prince and deputy to the throne (Munshi Turkman 1377, V 1: 341-348).

The Safavid government faced an increasing discontent of the Qizilbash people during the reign of Sultan Mohammad Khodabandeh, and Qizilbash emirs were particularly upset about this issue. The Safavid king had no authority over government affairs because of his blindness and other factors, and Qizilbash emirs were particularly unhappy with this issue. In an effort to gain the attention of his subordinates, Sultan Mohammad Shah sent lavish gifts and made donations from the treasury (Aghajari, Allahyari, 2015: 15). He also engaged all Qizilbash leaders in various provinces and provided those with wages and perks for one or even two years in advance. He shared what he had discovered with princes, owners, sheriffs' heads, and other locals. However, none of these royal gifts were able to solve the government's issues. Since the Shah's wife, Mahd-e Olia Khair-u-Nasa Begum, a Seyyed from the Marashi line of Mazandaran, controlled the authority and ruled instead of the Shah, Qizilbash force complained about this problem as well. Mahd-e Olia, a foe of Qizilbash interests, did all in her power to increase the influence of Tajiks in national governance. Her acts enraged Qizilbash force further. They understood that Mahd-e Olia would not let them act as they pleased and try to circumvent the restrictions as long as she was alive (Newman, 2006: 115). The Qizilbash force initially met at the palace to express their displeasure with Mahd-e Olia's treatment of them to King Muhammad Khudabandeh. Mahd-e Olia responded angrily and referred to them as hypocrites. In any event, the harem was assaulted by Qizilbash forces, who slaughtered Mahd-e Olia and many other Mazandarans while robbing the harem of its belongings. Any Mazandaran residents who fell into their clutches outside the harem were slaughtered (Sefat Gol, 2008: 58). A few days after the queen was killed, Qizilbash emirs convened at Mohammad Shah's palace and swore allegiance to him, and then to Hamza Mirza after him. The Shah and Hamza Mirza's incapacity, which was amply shown by their failure to bring

the queen's assassins to justice, led to fierce rivalry among the nobility and tribes of Qizilbash, which was reminiscent of the conflicts at the start of Shah Tahamasab's reign. The emirs Qizilbash Stajlu and Shamlu staged a revolt against the federal authority at the same time in Khorasan. These two tribes made a pact to support Abbas-Mirza, the son of Sultan Muhammad Khodabande, and even issued coins and sermons in his honor. They also chose him to rule as their leader (Afusheh-e Natanzi, 1971: 127). The Shah was pushed by Prime Minister, Mirza Salman, to march to Khorasan and was also accused of hypocrisy by the authorities who opposed this decision. Finally, the Shah sent a sizeable army to Khorasan and besieged Herat. After Herat was under siege for a while, one of the rebel commanders there, Ali Qholi Khan made peace with the Shah and headed to the western frontier to engage the Ottomans in a battle. At the commencement of Mohammad Khodabandeh's administration, a group of Iranian-subordinated Kurds began an invasion of Azerbaijan at the behest of the king of Van. The people of Shirvan then petitioned the Ottoman sultan to seize that province. Sultan Murad deployed an army of Crimean Tatars to these regions in 1607/ 986 AH as a result, and the Safavid army suffered a series of setbacks. In any event, there was a battle and fighting between Iran and the Ottomans up until Shah Abbas I came to power, and several regions were taken by the Ottomans (Louis Blanc, 1996: 56). Following the Safavids' loss in the Battle of Chaldiran, these events demonstrated the divergence of the administration Shah Ismail I had established with Qizilbash people, as well as the growing weakness of the central government.

The trust that Qizilbash had in Safavid rulers was lost as a result of this breakdown in the connection between Muridi and Moradi. In the first thirty years of his administration, Shah Tehamasab, who came from an almost hopeless position, had several triumphs. He also put down these centrifugal-minded rebellious Qizilbash emirs during a ten-year civil war. He resisted significant east and west assaults with pitifully little resources. The Safavid authority was subject to severe limitations as a result of the struggle on two fronts. This meant that neither the west nor the east could deploy the Safavids' full force, and in actuality, the Safavid army's size was never greater than that of the Ottoman and Uzbek armies. With his campaigns in the Caucasus, Shah Tehamasab introduced Georgian, Circassian, and Armenian captives into the Safavid government, endangering the position of the Qizilbash. The introduction of these new elements into the Safavid government had significant military and political repercussions for them in the future. Shah Tehamasab, who was occupied with battling factions, treason, and betrayal, was able to protect the

Safavid administration from both his brothers and the Qizilbash force leaders for more than fifty years. The centrist forces made advantage of the central government's existing term from Shah Tehamasab's death till Shah Abbas I's accession and expanded their power. The assassinations of Shah Ismail II, Mahd-e Olia, and Hamza Mirza by rebellious Qizilbash emirs were indications of the advent of the centrist Qizilbash and certain courtiers in the Safavid government's political and military scene at this crucial period.

Conclusion

With Chaldiran's loss in 1541/ 920 A.H., the Safavid administration started to diverge, and this conflict had negative effects. With the breaking of Shah Ismail I's pride, it caused him to withdraw from political and military affairs until the end of his life. On the other hand, it led to the rise of power of Qizilbash and their turning to divergence and flight. These events damaged the dignity and charismatic credibility of the Safavids as an invincible rule. Almost all of the court proceedings throughout the first 10 years of Shah Tehamasab I's administration were portrayed as a ten-year period due to government focus. The Qizilbash commanders were in charge of running the government at this time, leaving the Shah with almost little authority. The leaders of Qizilbash, who were Munshi Turkman tribe members, participated in events that resembled civil wars, and throughout these battles, they attempted to seize control of the government's operations. Internal unrest made matters worse when the Ottomans and Uzbeks invaded Iran from the west and east, but in the years that followed, Shah Tehamasab was able to maintain control over the Safavid government for almost 50 years by successfully managing the situation. This effectively consolidated the Safavid government's power. By giving Qizilbash leaders control over important and sizeable kingdoms, using Iranian court families in the central administration, and even appointing certain Georgian prisoners as officials, Shah Tehamasab attempted to strike a balance between several strong clans. In essence, his foreign policy was defensive. In order to avoid the Ottoman government's invasion, he transferred the capital from Tabriz to Qazvin. In 934 AH, he also signed a peace deal with them in Amasya. Internal disagreements and confrontations amongst Qizilbash princes resumed under the rule of Shah Ismail II, which led to his demise and the growth of the center of escape for Qizilbash and certain Safavid princes. Many of the Qizilbash leaders who considered Mahd-e Olia a threat to their centrism were irritated by him once Mohammad Khodabandeh arrived. Ultimately, this matter resulted in the killing of Mahd-e Olia and Hamza

Mirza, demonstrating the propensity of these forces to diverge. It was the central government's weakness during the Safavid era. Ottomans and Uzbeks attacked Iran from the west and the east as a result of the succession battles and disagreements during Muhammad Khodabande's period, and until Shah Abbas came to power, forces in the Safavid court were still defined by centripetalism.

Bibliography

- [1] Abisaab, RulaJurdi, (2004). *Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire*. Vol. 1. IB Tauris.
 - [2] Abolhamad, Abdul Hamid, (1997). *Principles of Politics*, Volume 1, Chapter 7, Tehran.
 - [3] Afushthai Natanzi, Mahmoud bin Hedayatullah (1993). *Naqawah al-Akhtar fi Zikr al-Akhbar in Safavid History*, with the effort of Ehsan Eshraghi, Tehran: Scientific and Cultural.
 - [4] Aghajari, Hashem, (2008). *An Introduction to the Relationship between Religion and Government in Safavid Iran*, Tehran: Tarh-e Nu.
 - [5] Aghajari, S H, Allahyari H., (2015). 'Historical Analysis of Relationship between Siadat and Kalantar Position in the Safavid Era'. *JHS* 2015; 7 (1): Pp37-57.
 - [6] *Alam- ara-ye Safavi*, (1984). by Yadullah Shukri, Tehran: Etelaat Publisher.
 - [7] Amoretti, B. S., (1986). 'Religion in the Timurid and Safavid periods', in the collection of articles on *The History of Iran during the Safavid Era*, The Cambridge History of Iran, Publisher Cambridge University Press, Pp. 610-655.
 - [8] Bakhshi Ostad M. A., Heidari A. R., (2021). 'Social Order in the Safavid State with Emphasis on North's Theory of the Fragile Natural State'. *JHS* 13 (1): Pp1-46
 - [9] Birjandifar, Nazak (2019). 'Negotiating Power: Gilan and Its Gradual Incorporation into the Safavid Polity'. Institute of Islamic Studies. McGill University, Montreal. February. <https://escholarship.mcgill.ca/downloads/ww72bd970> D.C. World Bank.
 - [10] Ddara J., Tolue H., (2022). 'Analysis of the Political Construction of the State in Iran Comparison of the Safavid and Qajar'. *JHS* 13 (2): Pp 81-108.
 - [11] Falsafi, Nasrallah (1992). *Life of Shah Abbas I*, Tehran: Scientific and Cultural.
 - [12] Foran, John F., (1989). "The Making of an External Arena: Iran's Place in the World-System, 1500-1722," Review (Fern and Braudel Center) 12, 1: 71-119.
 - [13] Hintz, Walter (1992). *Shah Ismail II Safavid*, translated by KikavosJahandari, Tehran: Scientific and Cultural.
 - [14] Hosseini Estrabadi, Seyyed Morteza, (1985). *From Sheikh Safi to Safi (Sultani history)*, Ehsan Eshraghi, Tehran: Scientific and Cultural.
 - [15] Hushang Mahdavi, Abdul Reza, (2012). *History of Iran's Foreign Relations*, Tehran: Amir Kabir.
 - [16] Kasravi, Ahmad, (1983). *Musha'ashites*, Tehran: Tahuri.
 - [17] Khand Mir, (1974). 'Habib al-Sir in the news of human beings', Mahmoud Debir Siaghi, Tehran, Khayyam.
 - [18] Khunji, Fazlullah bin Ruzbehan, (1996). *Alam- ara-ye Amini*, by the efforts of Abbas Mokhbar, Tehran: Bonghah Tarjomeh and Nashr-e Ketab.
 - [19] Lockhart, Laurence, (1999). "The Persian Army in the Safavid Period," *Der Islam* 42, Pp. 99-99.
 - [20] Louis Blanc, Lucin, (1996). *The Life of Shah Abbas*, translated by Valiullah Shadan, Tehran: Asatir.
 - [21] Manor, J., (1999). *The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization*. Washington,
 - [22] Matthee, Rudi (1996). "Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid Iran," in *Melville*, ed., Safavid Persia, London, Pp. 389-416.
 - [23] Munshi Turkman, Iskandar Beg (1998). *History of Abbasid Scholars* by Esmail Rizvani, Tehran: World of Books.
 - [24] Nabawe, Mustafa, (1973). *Administrative and Political Centralization and Decentralization in Iran*, Chapter 1, Tehran: Khajeh Publications.
 - [25] Navaei, Abdul Hossein, (1971). *Shah Tehamasab Safavi*, Tehran: Farhang Iran Foundation.
 - [26] Navaei, Abdul Hossein, Ghafarid, Abbas Qoli, (2002). *History of Iran's Political, Social, Economic and Cultural Developments during the Safavid Period*, Tehran: Samt.
 - [27] Newman, Andrew J., (2006). *Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire*. New York: I. B. Tauris.
 - [28] Pirnia and Iqbal, Hassan and Abbas (1991). *History of Iran*, Tehran: Khayyam.
- Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2008, Pp. 351-372.
- [29] Roemer, H.R., (1999). "The Safavid Period" in *The Timurid and Safavid Periods* ed. by Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart, volume 6 of The Cambridge History of Iran, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
 - [30] Romelu, Hasan Beg (1978). *Ahsan al-Tawarikh*, edited by Abdul Hossein Navaei, Tehran: Babak Publications.

- [31] Sarwar, Ghulam (1995). *History of Shah Ismail*, translated by Mohammad Baqer Aram and Abbas Qoli Ghafari Fard, Tehran: Academic Publishing Center.
- [32] Savory, Roger, (1980). *Iran under the Safavids*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- [33] Savory, Roger, (2008). *The Organizational System of the Safavids*,
- [34] Savory, Roger, Marvin (2003). Relations between the Safavid State and its Non-Muslim Minorities, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 14, No. 4, October, Pp 435- 458.
- [35] SefatGol, Mansour (2002). *The Institutional Structure of Religious Thought in Safavid Iran*, Tehran: Rasa Cultural Services.
- [36] SefatGol, Mansour (2011). *Faraz o froud Safaviyan*, Tehran: Young Thought Center.
- [37] Shirazi, Abdibig, (1980). *Taklama al-Akhbar*, Tehran: Ney Publication.
- [38] Sicker, Martin, (2001). *The Islamic World in Decline: From the Treaty of Karlowitz to the Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire*. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 027596891X.
- [39] Taheri, Abol Qasem (2010). *Social and political history of Iran from the death of Timur to the death of Shah Abbas*, Tehran: Khwarazmi.
- [40] Taheri, Abul qasem (1993). *Local Governments and Decentralization*, Ch. 2, Tehran: Qhumes.
- [41] Tausz, Katalin, (2002). *The Impact of Decentralization on Social Policy, Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative*, Open Society Institute Budapest, Hungary, p; xv.
- [42] Vale Isfahani, Mohammad Yusuf, (1993). *Khold-e Barin*, by Mir Hashem Mohhaddes, Tehran: Mahmoud Afshar Endowment Foundation.



انفعال در انسجام قدرت صفویان (از شکست در جنگ چالدران تا پایان دوره سلطان محمد خدابنده)

حمید بلوچی^۱، کورش صالحی^۲

^۱ دانش آموخته کارشناسی ارشد تاریخ ایران
از گروه تاریخ دانشگاه سیستان و بلوچستان
E-mail: hamid.balouchi1371@gmail.com

^۲ دانشیار گروه تاریخ، دانشکده ادبیات و
علوم انسانی، دانشگاه سیستان و بلوچستان،
ایران (نویسنده مسئول).

E-mail: salehi@lihu.usb.ac.ir

چکیده

حکومت صفویه با شکست در جنگ چالدران با چالشی بزرگ در ایجاد تمرکز (انسجام) بین حکومت مرکزی و نظام ملوک الطوائفی گرفتار آمد. شاه اسماعیل با کمک قزلباشان توانست بر قدرت‌های محلی مسلط و به طور نسبی بخش‌هایی از قلمرو ایران زمین را به زیر یک پرچم گرد آورد. با رسمی شدن تشیع در ایران، دو قدرت عثمانی و ازبکان تحریک شده؛ و به دلیل اختلافات مرزی و مذهبی، جنگ‌هایی متعددی میان صفویان و این دو نیرو در گرفت. پس از شکست صفویان در چالدران، قدرت‌های محلی داخلی که تمایلات گریز از مرکز داشتند بر اقتدار خویش افزودند و قدرت چند شاه صفوی را تحت الشعاع قرار دادند. این تحقیق که با روش تحقیق تاریخی همراه با توصیف و تحلیل انجام شده و با طرح این سوال که علل و عوامل انفعال حکومت صفوی در ایجاد تمرکز (انسجام) از شکست در جنگ چالدران تا پایان دوره سلطان محمد خدابنده صفوی چه بوده است؟ به بررسی موضوع می‌پردازد و در پاسخ فرض تحقیق بر این استوار است که انفعال حکومت صفوی به عواملی نظیر پیامدهای شکست چالدران در ابعاد مادی و معنوی و تشکیل مراکز گریز از مرکز داخلی نظیر نافرمانی سران قزلباش و خوانین متمرکز، باعث تحلیل رفتن توان تمرکز (انسجام) قدرت صفویان در این مقطع مهم تاریخی گردید. دستاورد تحقیق نشان می‌دهد که بعد از شکست چالدران ساختار حکومت مرکزی صفوی با چالش بزرگی در ایجاد تمرکز (انسجام) روبرو گردید و اینچالش با اندکی نوسان در دوره شاهان بعدی نیز تا پایان دوره محمد خدابنده تداوم داشته است.

واژگان کلیدی: حکومت صفویه، شاه اسماعیل اول، نبرد چالدران، واگرایی، قزلباشان