The Political Parties of Iran between 1941 and 1947, With Especial References on the Right-Wings Parties

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Abstract

Considering the importance of the right wing parties in Iranian political history, this article has tried to provide necessary information and discussions, which help us to understand the reasons of their formation and activities in order to fill the vacuum, which exist in this domain.

For this purpose, I have tried to analyze three political phases and their relations to the political awareness of Iranian population. Then utilizing the existing documents and references, I have emphasized the role and the aims of ruling class and intellectuals in the formation of political parties such as Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli and Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran. Finally, by examining the role and the effect of foreign countries (Britain and Soviet Union) in the political objectives of theses parties, I have proceeded to the people’s reactions to this end, which resulted to the downfall of such parties.

Key words: Right-Wings Parties, Political Awareness, Foreign Countries Effects.

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Introduction

Most historians of Iran regard the emergence of the first political parties as coming with the Constitutional Revolution in 1905-11, and this preliminary stage of political activities lasted until 1921, the year Riza Shah came to power. These parties were outcomes of traditional oligarchy patterns, slightly more structured, and with an explicit ideology broadly on nationalism and liberal democracy. In the second stage, (which start 1921 and continue until 1941), most of the parties vanished or went underground. The third stage, while out of our brief (1941-53) was one, in which party activity was able to enlist the participation of virtually the entire politically aware population [Cottam, 1963, pp. 93-4].

Those parties that arose in 1941 in response to Riza Shah’s abdication, relaxation in censorship and increased freedom of the press, in general, adopted patriotic and nationalist names and published their own newspapers, most with irregular issues and limited circulation. These were often formed by prominent figures or small groups based on a band or Dawra; seeking representation in the Majlis, as a deputy or minister. It was therefore inevitable that many such minor parties disappeared, once the elections for the 14th Majlis were over. The existence of these groups was characterised by fierce in-fighting, carried on through the organs of each particular party. It is noteworthy that this situation reflects the common circumstance of bitter acrimony between rivals, with similar programmes, all of which are competitors for the same audience. For all the actual differences between such parties, it would not have mattered, if they were based upon Constitutional democracy, dictatorship, Islam, or implemented on the basis of Marxist, nationalist or religious principles.

Those fewer parties, which did, on the other hand, had more lasting effect on the political arena, in terms both of ideology and political administration can be subdivided into three groups, according to political persuasion: On the left were Hizb-i-Tuda and the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan. On the right, three types of parties emerged that comprised Conservatives, and pro-British notables such as Sayyid Ziya’s National Will Party, Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran and the others which this article want to focus on them; then there were the extreme nationalist parties, which included the Pan Iran, Sumka, Ariya, and the National Salvation Group of the Revolutionary Nationalist Party; lastly, there were the religious groups such as Fida’iyan-i-Islam and Mujahedin-i Islam.

Right-Wing Parties

All of the conservative parties had their base in response to the growth of the Tudeh party [Zabih, 1966, pp.11-2 & Razi, 1970]. This meant naturally, that their ideology was rooted in reaction to that of the Tudeh. This circumstance, when allied with the offensive against the Communist-linked Tudeh, produced an extreme right - wing ideology that was shared by all the conservative parties. Several other factors also served to increase this tendency; all these parties had close ties with the Court [Abrahamian, 1969, p.16 ff], which were actively pro-British. The Tudeh was seen as Soviet-
sponsored [Cuyler, 1952, p.140], and thus left-wing and right-wing had not only internal clashes but also rivaled in the context of international politics. Cottam’s party typology classifies the differences between right- and left-wing parties based on some criteria [Cottam, 1968, pp.86-7]: the left was personality independent, the right personality dependent; leadership recruited from the new intellectual as well as from the oligarchy; a situation paralleled fairly closely also among the rank and file membership; the left was narrowly and rigidly ideological, whereas the right, still narrow, yet hadn’t broader ideological appeal when compared with the Tudeh authoritarian and non-authoritarian. Within this general typology, we shall differentiate between the conservative and pro-British type, and that of extreme nationalist tendencies [Razi, 1970, pp.72, 74-6].

Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli

The founder of the Irada-yi Milli was Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabataba‘i, whose political activity began with the foundation of the Hizb-i Vatan, which was re-organised into the Halqa Party in mid-1944. The Halqa system formed the basis of Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli which resembled in some ways, a secret society: members of each of the ten halqas were responsible only to their circle-leader, who in turn was one of a group of 9 responsible to a group leader. Each member was addressed only by his rank and number [Praeger 1965, p.362]. This system developed into the Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli after the 1944 oil crisis.

Hizb-i Vatan and the succeeding Irada-yi Milli were formed by nationalist conservative elements to counter the Hizb-i Mardum. Irada-yi Milli, supported by the British, parried the Tudeh’s attacks on the West by criticising the Soviet Union, and accusing the Tudeh of being a tool of the Soviet government. The Irada-yi Milli itself, closely associated with Britain and with the Court, was conservative in ideology, and was traditional in constitution to be sufficiently innovative or flexible in the circumstances. This difficulty could not be overcome even by the election of Sayyid Ziya to the 14th Majlis from the British zone of occupation, together with the support of a number of Majlis deputies and members of the old oligarchy. With the assistance of the police, member of the party organized assaults upon Tudeh clubs and trade unions, killing active left-wing agents, and at the same time disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda [Machalski, p.157].

The Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli was the largest and most active among the conservative parties. It had branches all over Iran, including the Northern provinces where Vatan formerly had much influence. The President of its Central Committee was Riza Quli Hidayat, Vice-Presidents Ali Asghar Firuz, Husayn Kashif and Firuzan. Sayyid Ziya was a Secretary, along with Sadiq Sarmadi, the editor of Nida-ye Iran and Pasargad, editor of Khorshid-i Iran. In spite of parallel position on the right to the left-wing Tudeh, and strong support from the West, the Iranian Court, and its own organisation and propaganda, the Irada-yi Milli could lasted no longer than two years, and was dissolved by Qavam in 1945. Sayyid Ziya was imprisoned and though released after the 15th
Majlis elections, he was unable to revive the party. A number of its members, however, adopted other labels, and continued their support to the Court. One of the major reasons for the party’s dissolution was Sayyid Ziya’s inability to establish himself as the champion of nationalism: he was regarded by many as an arch-traitor and an instrument of British imperialism. In 1920-21, as editor of Raad, the British ambassador in Teheran described Sayyid Ziya as a notorious anglophile [Norman and Curzon, 1921, p.745]. Iranians also saw Sayyid Ziya as instrumental in bringing Riza Khan to power in 1921 coup. On his return to Iran from Palestine, he was therefore immediately suspected of working again with his old ally, a suspicion that was in fact well-founded. The American ambassador reported to Washington that Sayyid Ziya was encouraged by the British, who also persuaded the Shah not to oppose him or his political activity [Foreign Relations, 1943, p.389]. Furthermore, Sayyid Ziya failed to make his party the sole defence against Communism, for he had rival parties-Adalat, Qavam’s Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran, and the court, with its military supporters. Sayyid Ziya also compromised the party to some extent by pledging different things to different classes, particularly land distribution between landowners and peasants, promises he was unable to fulfill for long term. The right-wing parties did not have wide appeal to the Iranian public who had recently been released from the oppression of Riza Shah’s rule. Musaddiq pointed out on March 8, 1944, in the 14th Majlis: The present regime in Iran is not really one of freedom for the simple reason that it takes a long time for a nation to recover morally from the effects of a prolonged period of dictatorship. It is for the deputies to help and lead the people. Sayyid Ziya can only work when he can close the Majlis and silence the press [Parliamentary Procedures, Mar. 8, 1944].

Several points can be drawn from the limited success of the Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli with regard to its appeal and structure. Its strong pro-British leaning although clearly to counter the Soviet influence, was a stumbling block for its wider acceptance. Cottam has observed that, while the Hizb-i Irada-yi Milli and the Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran resembled each other closely in typology, there was a substantial difference in degree of perceived attachment, with regard to relations with the British, among the Iranian public [Cottam, 1968, pp.86-7]. Thus, Qavam was believed to be close to the British as the most aristocratic politicians were, Sayyid Ziya, however, was believed to be at least as close to the British as the Soviets were the Tudeh. Among the new intellectual class, which now formed the most politically aware group within the country, and were therefore a major source for appeal to recruitment, several different views-points existed. The Irada-yi Milli inevitably limited its appeal to this group by adopting an extreme pro-British stance, for others felt that ties with the USSR could equally well be made. While others again felt that Iran’s dignity could only be restored through the restoration of lost territories; the majority of the new intellectuals rejected any close association with a foreign power, (although accepting Iran’s boundaries as essentially unalterable) [Ibid., pp.87-8]. Secondly, it was becoming clear in this period (1941-6) that the earlier appeal was less effective
in mobilising the political awareness than a narrow ideology. In this respect, the party could be compared with the European Fascist movement of the 1930s, for it combined a backward-looking ideology with a modern organisation, and at the same time was militantly anti-Communist, appealing to nationalist and socialist sympathies. It extolled traditional values, while still exploiting any from of discontent open to it, not hesitating to use violence against its chief opponents [Abrahamian, op.cit., p.131]. This resemblance to fascism was noted by the American technical advisor Millsbaugh, who was indebted to Sayyid Ziya for supporting him in the Majlis, without considering the Irada-yi Milli as tending towards fascism [Millsbaugh, op.cit., p.78].

The Hizb-i Milli finally disintegrated under the dual factors of Sayyid Ziya’s personality and lack of ground support. It was not a party that was truly an outgrowth of general Iranian sentiment, but an artificial and imposed ideology, that, together with its violent measures, prevented its spread and genuine acceptance within Iranian political life.

**Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran**

Dimukrat-i Iran was a party created by Ahmad Qavam in 1946, when he was Prime Minister. It took form as a direct counter-balance to Tudeh influence within the Majlis for Qavam felt his position threatened by the presence of seven Tudeh cabinet members, especially in view of opposition party in government [Dimukrat-i Iran, Jan. 3, 1947], something which the Iranian political system lacked, despite her constitutional basis. Thus, he announced over the state radio on June 29th about the creation of the Hizb-i Dimukrat to contest the election against the Tudeh [Ibid., Oct., 24, 1946, p.2]. This step further accentuated the divisions existing between the Shah and the left, as Qavam indicated to each his intention of bringing about the downfall of the other. Using ex-Tudeh agitators, such as Ali Umid to help organise the Dimukrat-i Iran, Qavam established a strong coalition of landowners and higher officials, representing the interests of the bourgeoisie and defining the feudal system. The party thus represented the old aristocracy who sought revenge against Riza Shah for ousting them from power, and the newer middle-class created by Riza Shah; both elements were present in the first Central Committee of July 10, 1946.

There was, however, one serious setback. The programme called for equal franchise; was opposed by the popular Ayatullah Kashani. The party tried in vain to find an equally impressive religious leader to advocate its own point of view [Fahang, Mar 28, 1948], but it lost considerable support over this issue.

Problematic, too, was the Hizb-i Dimukrat’s support from the bazaar, exemplified by three figures — Abu al-Husayn Mirzada, a sayyid, Dr. Baqa’i, a European-educated lawyer, and Husayn Makki, a historian, all of whom were friendly with Kashani. The party’s link with the bazar was destroyed when the Hizb-i Dimukrat was secularised following the expulsion of Hairizada from the Central Committee.

The initial development of the Hizb-i Dimukrat, until its coalition with the Tudeh (together with the Firqa-yi Dimukrat-i Azarbajjan, Hizb-i Iran, Iran-i
Ma, and Hizb-i Susyalist) on August 1, 1946 (when it achieved actual party status) followed one among several options. The party could have consolidated its position among the aristocracy, by adding the new aristocrats. It could have made further inroads among the intellectual and middle-classes. Or, it could have assumed the role which the Tudeh had fulfilled among the urban working class. In fact, the Hizb-i Dimukrat ventured into all three areas, as part of its ploy of setting different classes against one another.

The party appealed to the middle-classes in various ways: a great deal of work was done amongst youth groups, so that the party's constituency was to be found within the secondary schools; a women's organisation flourished, since many Iranian women were dissatisfied with their position. Support also came from the professional classes — including engineering, industrial management and technocratic classes who, similar to the upper classes, were unhappy with the high handedness of the Tudeh [Khwandaniha, Sept., 28, 1955]. The working class represented a very hazardous area of appeal. Sine, Qavam was trying to keep peace with the Tudeh, in order to convince them of his support, he dared not encroach upon their main field of activity — the working classes.

The solution to this dilemma was the coalition of the Dimukrat and the Tudeh and its controlling council of United Trades Unions. It was a very fragile alliance, for the hard-liners who opposed the Court clashed with those urging compromise with the Shah, and there was a split between those who favoured supporting British interests and those, including Qavam himself, who favoured the US, within the Dimukrat.

The party was further weakened with the break up of the 'marriage of convenience' between basically incompatible factions: the intelligentsia opposed to the aristocracy, landowners set against salaried workers, conservatives clashing with radicals. One right-wing radical intellectual wrote that Qavam was a multi-millionaire in control of property the size of Belgium, who was merely trying to deceive the discontented by pledging his support to them against capital feudals [F.Ala Karim A., 1964, P.7].

Following the collapse of this cabinet coalition, labour policy changed dramatically. The previously inactive Minister of Labour and Information, Muzaffar Firuz, set up a workers' organisation for non-Communist wage earners, which stripped the Tudeh of its major asset — the working class [Khwandaniha, Apr. 24, 1948]. The Dimukrat-i Iran then implemented Qavam's labour law of 1946, by negotiating higher wages from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the Soviet-operated fisheries, and by creating a syndicate of Iranian workers, run by leading anti-Communists. After the collapse of the CCUTU, which managed to retain its power and remained a major political force, which Qavam was determined to break, its General Secretary was arrested, its paper banned, organisers detained, and the headquarters and party buildings were occupied by the army. This represented the Dimukrat's most important strategic success. It determined to break the influence of the Tudeh in the long run, however, its down fall, process became disaffected against the Tudeh and, group by group, left, many in fact
joining the Tudeh [Zafar, Aban 1325]. Qavam’s concern for the security of the left also gave cause for concern to conservative Iranian pro-Western opinion, which believed that by controlling the 15th Majlis, he would sacrifice Iran’s resources, beliefs that were, in fact, unfounded.

The failure [Ibid., Oct.1946] of the Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Iran highlights its three major problems. The working masses were politically unaware, and it was therefore a very difficult and painstakingly slow task to mobilise them. Secondly, the only way to gain the support of the new intellectuals was to develop a very narrow ideology. Lastly, the harsh measures used against the Tudeh caused such demoralisation amongst the party’s membership that it is clear that violent means were much ineffective [Ibid., Nov.1946].

The Hizb-i Dimukrat was essentially an elitist party, not rooted in masses, whose rapid rise was due to support from the army and police. Thus, with Qavam’s resignation as Prime Minister, his party was dissolved too. Its members, realising that the Hizb-i Dimukrat was similar in format and aim to that of Sayyid Ziya’s Irada-yi Milli, defected to the Tudeh Party.

**Hizb-i Adalat**

The Adalat traces its origins as far as 1941, when the association of “patriots, honest, and unselfish people” first came into existence, and it became one of the largest and most popular parties in Iran. The party’s constitution was formed on the disintegration of the Iran National Party: the new party order favoured an American alliance.

The leader of Adalat was Ali Dashti, who initially appeared to support the reforming programme of Riza Shah. This support gradually dissipated, and following Riza Shah’s abdication, Dashti was in fact a bitter and vociferous critic of the monarchy over the issues as the crown lands, a court party or military control. It was also led at different times by Jamal Imami, a French-educated civil servant, Siphidhi, the director of Tehran radio, and various other deputies.

Hizb-i Adalat confronted with a lack of credibility after its formation. Its liberal stance was ridiculed and a popular joke at the time was made with Dashti’s name: his initials were Ayn Dal, and the word alat meant ‘tool’, and the pun suggested that Dashti ruled the party personally.

Nevertheless, the party had two strong allies: Factory managers in Tehran set up trade unions which supported Hizb-i Adalat; and the party was reputedly linked to the secret paramilitary group, the National Movement, led by General Arya. Although, Adalat was predominantly composed of senior civil servants and older professionals, its programme was so constructive as to appeal to a wider range of audience. Its first aim was to oppose dictatorship, either individual or collective, and place control of public affairs purely in the hands of the trade unions. Secondly, it was to promote personal freedom, of the press, industry and commerce, and freedom before the law, so that all inequalities would be abolished. This entailed assigning all production to nationalised industry with the hope that the government would deal only with social policy. Agriculture was to be strengthened by setting up water installations, distributing seed-corn, and improving health
facilities; education and administration were also
to be reformed [Maram-I Ma, Nov.1943].
A clear demonstration of Adalat’s limited
success in the 14th Majlis can be seen with the fact
that despite the help of Prime Minister Suhayli,
and the Minister of the Interior, the party could
manage 11 seats. The impact of the party was, in
any case, limited within the Majlis. Thus, its seats
were linked to the structure of the parliamentary
bureaucracy, its working support came from union
members in the factories, and its white-collar
elements were drawn from the ranks of senior civil
servants [Abrahamian, op.cit., p.129].
At the party’s zenith, Imami and his brother
were directors of the Bank of Iran; Khwajanuri
worked in the Propaganda office. The support,
however, rapidly declined when Adalat lost its
grasp on important posts. It finally disintegrated
with Qavam’s creation of the Hizb-i Dimukrat-i
Iran. Its leaders disappeared in different directions:
Dashti to Europe, Imami to prison, Khwajanuri
defected to Qavam, while the unions were
dissolved, and its provincial branches collapsed
[Khwanandaniha, July 1946].

Hizb-i Umidvar
Umidvar was formed in 1942 with a nucleus group
of 11 men, all highly educated and many holding
influential positions. Its leader was Ali Akbar
Tabrizi, a pro-democratic and anti-
dictatorship figure. In 1939, at the beginning of the War,
Tabrizi supported the allied powers. However,
Tabrizi became suspicious of the British. These
fears later disappeared, and he again put forward to
any who would listen, persuasive arguments in
favour of the Allied cause. As with Sayyid Ziya’s
pro-British policy, this attitude gained Umidvar
little support. Patriotic Iranians refused to join,
although the party’s agenda included the protection
of Iranian interests and freedom by encouraging
patriotic direction and the pursuit of justice,
interpreted both morally and religiously. The party
insisted on a forward-looking policy of struggle
against foreign intervention, and misleading
propaganda, treason, injustice and dishonest
officialdom [Journale de Tehran, May 1943].
The tactical programme included private and
public meetings and the distribution of
propaganda. The party hoped for police
recognition and planned for what assistance an
protection they would ultimately require [Ibid.,].
The history and development of the Hizb-i
Umidvar is mystery, since there is little material
available regarding this. From the scanty
information, however, it certainly seems that the
party was crushed by the hostility of an oppressive
government, and reaction against its support to
Britain.
There were also, apart from the above true
parties, a number of what should properly be
defined as fractions, of small discussion groups,
although some called themselves parties. These
were very short-lived and with minor influence,
and as such little extant informations are available
about them. Most of them could sustained only a
few months or a few days before they dissolved and
amalgamated with other relatively larger parties.
Since their programmes resemble those of the
organised parties, we shall not find the need to
repeat them here. Our main aim in this section is
merely to include a brief outline of all parties and groups in order to present a total picture of the political activity in Iran during this period.

The Hizb-i Istiqqlal was one of the parties that put forward a more carefully planned programme [lamiyya-yi Hizb-i Istiqqlal, Mihr, 1325]. As, its name indicates, Istiqqlal sought to defend the sovereignty of Iran. Its leader, Abd al-Qadir Azad, gave his name (which means ‘free’) to the December Revolution of 1942. Istiqqlal’s main opponent was Sayyid Ziya, who clashed because of his dictatorial tendencies. Its membership numbered around 150 [Elwell-Sutton, Private notes].

Hizb-i Dihqan was founded in May 1942. It firmly had religious focus, although it concentrated its attention upon the vital Iranian agricultural potential [Ibid].

Early in the same year, the Hizb-i Khalq was set up under Fruzish, who was in the Ministry of Justice and editor of Najat-i Iran. This was a left-wing party, and had very limited activity. It centred its policy on an independent and sovereign Iran, protecting the country against foreigners, and developing a welfare state for its citizens [Ibid].

A very similar party was the Hizb-i Najat-i-Mihan, led by Pasargad, who also edited Khurshid-i Iran. Najat-i-Mihan primarily arose as a consequence of left-wing parties from where Pasargad and his colleagues had disaffected [Machalski, op.cit., p. 161].

Other parties established in this year (1942) included the Kargaran, the Mardan-i-Kar (led by Ibrahimi), and the Jabha-yi Azadi, which later amalgamated with the Tudeh [Elwell-sutton, private notes].

The Hizb-i Yaran was founded and led by Abbas Khalilzadeh and Ali Javahir Kalam, who edited Iqdam. Iqdam was replaced in 1945 by the weekly paper “Hur” [Machalski, op.cit., p. 150]. The party’s membership was drawn mainly from the bazaar. Its policy was vague, though it did focus toward the unification of patriotic Iranians; its class policy was never fully worked through. Hizb-i Yaran failed to spread through the country, and played no significant part either in internal or foreign policy [Elwell-Sutton, op.cit].

Finally, came the creation of the Hizb-i Kar in 1944, under the control of Naqisi. The primary duty of the party was to improve workers conditions in order to create a unified front. Its weekly paper, Pand [53], published the party’s policies, but the Hizb-i Kar contributed little on the Iranian political scene [Pand 1-5, 1944].

The focus of all these minor parties was almost exclusively in Tehran. Although a few branches were set up in other major cities, these were virtually ineffective. Since, these were run mostly by educated upper and middle class, they tended to turn rather limited ‘interest groups’, with no attraction for the working class. The conditions of membership were unvarying and the same as all parties or groups: Iranian citizenship, over the age of 18, with no criminal record.

In addition to these minor political parties, small groups and associations mushroomed rapidly in this period. One of the important of these was Kirmanshahiyan which had about 600 strong members and published its own paper, the Iran-i Jawan [Elwell-Sutton, op.cit.].
The Qumiha was popularly supposed to have been formed specifically for election purposes. It was certainly supported by Sayyid Ziya.

The Shimal-i Gharb had around 4000 members, the majority religious, who were notorious as trouble-makers. Another group set up for the election was Janub-i Gharbi. Others were linked with particular regions: Azarbajyan, a 2000 strong union supported the interests of that province; Saveh supported the Sava district; the Qazvinis; the Najat-i Milli; the Guruch-i shamshir, whose paper was Ittilaat-i Iran; the Paymaniyan Party, which supported the religious beliefs of 2000 members; the Kumita-yi Intilkhabi-yi Milli; the littadh; the Nahzat-i Milli; the Islam Society; and the Gulpayiganis from that city.

As with the larger parties, none of these small groups had the organisation or support to wield much influence, and they tended to dissolve into mere united-interest groups.

Conclusion

During the period 1941-47, the elements of the successful ideological appeal were becoming clear. An essential feature was an intense devotion to the goal of a truly independent Iran, with a dignity consonant with Iran's great past. They included, also, an acceptance of modernisation and achievement of values which called for rapid social and economic change, reforms within the administrative and judicial systems, agriculture, health care, education, working conditions and relations, and cultural liberalisation. Within these areas of general agreement, there was a wide range of viewpoints [Cottam, op.cit., pp.87-8]. We can thus distinguish three main types of political party.

The first[Shinana-yi Mihanparastun, 1944, pp.25-6] consisted of those established by the ruling class, whose membership was drawn from merchants, landowners and government officials. They promoted the interests of the ruling class who financed them. Such parties exist world-wide, and when one is eclipsed, soon reappears another to maintain class control. Sayyid Ziya's Irada-yi Milli and Hizbi- Dimukrat of Qavam provides a good example.

The second were nationalist parties, whose members were highly patriotic, educated and enthusiastic, and whose aim was to dismantle the ruling class and initiate internal reform in both social and economic spheres. They believed deeply in welfare for all Iranians, and held national history and cultural achievements in high regard, working towards the establishment of democratic government within Iran [Ibid., p.26]. Hizb-i Umidvar provides a good example.

The third were formed from those who supported a democratic national government, believing in welfare and equal opportunities for all citizens. Although this type of party tended to rely ultimately upon the Iranian people, yet they looked, too, towards external support of either a moral or material nature. They did not, by so doing, compromise their passionate patriotism and nationalist aims, but wished to learn from foreign ideological programmes, and to derive help from their parties in times of internal crisis [Ibid., p.27]. Hizb-i Adalat is a good example.

After the fall of Riza Shah's dictatorship in
1941, the political system fragmented completely, and the newly-found, and highly delicate tools of parliamentary politics failed to lead the Iranian people to a common goal as they ought to have done. Government attitude to the parties was at best indifferent, and most often hostile; collaborators of the reforming movements were frequently arrested during demonstrations, and the older, conservative elements within the government disrupted the progress of such parties.

A successful party required the support of both internal and external elements; the latter most often was found either in Britain or the Soviet Union. If internal support alone was achieved, a party could count only on a precarious future, for it risked foreign intervention, if its policies were not in the interests of an outside power. If, on the other hand, a party received support solely from external sources, as with the Irada-yi Milli, it too could count only on a limited future.

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احزاب سیاسی ایران در خلال سال‌های ۱۹۴۱ تا ۱۹۴۷ با تأکید بر احزاب راستگرگا

نگاه خندق

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با توجه به جایگاه خاص احزاب راست سال‌های ۱۹۴۱ تا ۱۹۴۷ در تاریخ سیاسی ایران، در مقایسه فوق علیه کردگرگان با ارزیابی مباحث مربوط به جمعی اطلاعاتی که ما را به این بخش به عنوان تشکیل، نحوه فعالیت و ساختار سیاسی این احزاب واقع می‌سازد، به نیاز و خلا موجود در این دهه پاسخ دهیم.

از این رو، در ابتدا با آشنا شدن در مراحل سئولیه پیامد اطلاعاتی احزاب سیاسی ایران (۱۹۴۳-۱۹۴۵) که در این مقاله میان گذرانش این احزاب و آگاهی سیاسی جامعه و تحلیل بررسی کنیم، مسیر با استفاده به شواهد و مدارک موجود، ضمن پرداختن به جایگاه طبیعی حاکم و روش‌نگار جامعه در این دهه احزاب به مقاومت نکوی طبیعی که آنها اشاره کردگرگان در این دهه ضمن تحلیل نقش دول استعماری انگلیسی و شوروی در سیاست‌های ایرانی برخی از این احزاب به آثار این مؤلفه در عدم حمایت مردم و در نتیجه انقضای آنها پرداخته‌ایم.

واژگان کلیدی: احزاب دست راست، شعر سیاسی، تأثير دول استعماری.